Hocking v Hocking

For applicants who are not spouses, reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 is confined to maintenance. This concerns recurring expenses of daily living at an appropriate standard. It may be provided by a lump sum where that capitalises a genuine income need, such as housing that relieves expenditure, but it is not a fund for general benefit, future house purchase or wedding costs.

Obligations under section 3(1)(d) generally mean obligations existing immediately before death. A claim cannot revive spent past obligations or compensate for earlier non-payment. The court must assess the statutory factors and must not redistribute the estate according to its own view of fairness.

Emma and Lucy Hocking, the deceased’s daughters, appealed against awards of £4,000 and £8,000 respectively made by His Honour Judge Weeks QC at the Bristol District Registry on 27 September 1995.

The deceased had died intestate, leaving a net estate of approximately £107,850. The applications were brought under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The appellants argued that their father’s past maintenance payments had been insufficient, that larger lump sums should reflect prospective house-purchase and wedding costs, and that Lucy’s educational income had been overstated. The central issues were the scope of maintenance and the extent to which the appellate court should interfere with the awards.

1. Disposition. Beldam LJ dismissed both appeals. Millett LJ and Otton LJ agreed. The awards made below were not shown to result from an error of law or an unjustified assessment.
2. Meaning of maintenance. Under section 1(2)(b) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, claims by children and other non-spouse applicants are limited to maintenance. Maintenance concerns provision which enables the applicant to meet recurring daily living expenses at an appropriate standard. A lump sum may be used to capitalise such a need, including a payment enabling an applicant to secure accommodation where that relieves income expenditure. The court adopted the approach stated in In re Dennis [1981] 2 All ER 140.
3. Past obligations. The deceased’s obligations and responsibilities under section 3(1)(d) generally mean those existing immediately before death. The provision cannot revive obligations which had ended in the past. Following Re Jennings [1994] Ch 286, earlier failure to pay child maintenance could not itself justify an additional award. The evidence also showed that maintenance for Lucy had continued until the deceased’s death.
4. Speculative capital. The power to capitalise maintenance did not extend to prospective capital for house purchase or wedding costs where no present maintenance need was established. The court approved the principle in In re Coventry [1980] Ch 461 that the Act does not give the court carte blanche to redistribute an estate. In re Callaghan was distinguished because the lump sum there met an identified accommodation need forming part of maintenance.
5. Statutory assessment and costs. The court considered the applicants’ resources and needs, the needs of the other applicant, the deceased’s responsibilities, the size and nature of the estate, and the applicants’ education or training. The error in estimating Lucy’s grant did not demonstrate that the overall award was invalid, particularly in light of the interim payment and the estate’s costs. The court also expressed strong concern about disproportionate costs. The appeals were dismissed, with the Court of Appeal costs payable from public funds through the Legal Aid Board subject to the stated conditions and legal aid taxation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [1997] EWCA Civ 1847, both appeals were dismissed and the awards made below were upheld.
• High Court, Bristol District Registry: His Honour Judge Weeks QC awarded Emma Hocking £4,000 and Lucy Hocking £8,000 under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.