Harrods Ltd v Remick (Elmi v Harrods Ltd, Harrods Ltd v Seeley)

Section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976 applies where employees supplied by their employer perform work which, in ordinary language, is work for a principal. The principal need not exercise an employer’s managerial control, and the work may also be for the employees’ employer.

The contract between the employer and principal need not have the supply of labour as its primary or dominant purpose. A contractual obligation to provide individuals to perform work for the principal is sufficient. The provision should receive a wide, purposive construction, consistent with its language, so that victims of racial discrimination are not left without a personal remedy.

Harrods licensed departments within its store to businesses which employed their own sales staff. The licensees had to provide suitable staff, while Harrods approved those individuals and could withdraw its approval. Mrs Remick and Mrs Seeley lost their employment after Harrods withdrew approval. Harrods refused to approve Mrs Elmi for proposed employment with another licensee.

Industrial Tribunals held in the Remick and Seeley proceedings that section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976 was capable of applying. A differently constituted tribunal found that Harrods had discriminated against Mrs Elmi but dismissed her complaint against Harrods on the legal grounds then advanced.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed Harrods’ appeals in the first two proceedings and allowed Mrs Elmi to rely on section 7. The three appeals were heard together. The question was whether the complainants would perform work for Harrods and were supplied by their respective employers under contracts with Harrods.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The Vice-Chancellor delivered the judgment. Waite and Ward LJJ agreed.

2. The sales activity performed by a licensee’s staff was work for Harrods within section 7(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976. At the moment of sale, the goods belonged to Harrods. The staff received the purchase money for Harrods, and Harrods retained its commission before accounting to the licensee. Harrods also imposed rules governing the staff’s conduct. In ordinary language, those activities were work for Harrods, although they were also work for the licensee as employer.

3. Section 7(1) does not require the principal to possess or exercise an employer’s managerial authority over the contract workers. That restriction did not appear in the statutory language and could not be inserted by construction. Nor was it necessary that the principal, rather than the employer, should itself make the work available to each individual.

4. The employers supplied their staff under contracts made with Harrods. It was immaterial that the contracts were principally concerned with operating departments and marketing goods. Section 7(1) contains no primary-purpose or dominant-purpose requirement. It is sufficient that the contract imposes an obligation to supply individuals to perform work which is properly described as work for the principal. The licensees’ duties to operate their departments and ensure adequate staffing satisfied that requirement.

5. The wide and remedial purpose of the legislation supported this construction. Sections 30 and 31 could be enforced only by the Commission for Racial Equality and afforded an individual victim no personal remedy. Consistently with Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd [1997] ICR 254, section 7 should therefore receive a purposive construction which remained consistent with its language and avoided leaving victims of discrimination without redress.

6. The orders of the Employment Appeal Tribunal were upheld. Harrods’ appeal was dismissed with costs, and leave to appeal was refused.

1. Court of Appeal: Harrods’ consolidated appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Employment Appeal Tribunal’s conclusions on section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976 were upheld.

2. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Harrods’ appeals in the Remick and Seeley proceedings were dismissed. Mrs Elmi’s appeal was allowed on the section 7 issue, although the tribunal upheld the rejection of her agency and employment-agency arguments.

3. Industrial Tribunals: In the Remick and Seeley proceedings, separate tribunals determined as a preliminary issue that section 7 was capable of applying. In Mrs Elmi’s proceeding, the tribunal found racial discrimination by Harrods but dismissed her complaint against Harrods because the agency and section 14 grounds then advanced were not established.