Director of Public Prosecutions v Evans

A traffic authority may use Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, section 82(2)(b), to direct that a road lacking the street lighting described in section 82(1) becomes a restricted road and therefore attracts the statutory 30 mph limit. The power is not confined to reversing an earlier de-restriction under section 82(2)(a). Sections 82(2)(b) and 84(1) may overlap, but that overlap does not justify an artificial construction. Any apparent inconsistency with subordinate traffic-sign provisions cannot displace the ordinary meaning of the primary legislation.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated from the decision of District Judge Morgan at Redditch Magistrates’ Court on 9 December 2003. The District Judge dismissed an information alleging that Claire Evans had driven on the B4551 above 30 mph, holding that two Worcestershire County Council orders could not lawfully make an unlit road a restricted road under section 82(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

The central issue was whether section 82(2)(b) permitted a traffic authority to designate an otherwise unrestricted road as a restricted road, or whether such a speed limit could be imposed only by an order under section 84(1).

1. Appeal allowed. The two Worcestershire County Council orders were lawful. The questions in the case stated were answered no, yes and yes.
2. Section 82(2)(b) bears its ordinary meaning. It permits a traffic authority to direct that a road which is not a restricted road becomes a restricted road. The power is therefore available where the road lacks the system of street lighting specified in section 82(1).
3. The respondent’s construction, limiting section 82(2)(b) to reversal of an earlier direction under section 82(2)(a), was artificial and unsupported by the statutory language. The suggestion that this construction rendered section 84 otiose was rejected. Section 84 permits speed limits other than 30 mph, and the existence of overlapping powers is not a reason to restrict either provision.
4. The court applied the principle in Harrods Ltd v Remick [1998] 1 All ER 52 that overlapping statutory powers do not justify an artificial restriction on ordinary meaning.
5. The apparent tension between section 82(2)(b) and direction 10 of the Traffic Signs Regulations 1994 did not justify departing from the statutory construction. If necessary, the primary legislation prevailed. Alternatively, direction 10 could be read as referring to the definition of a restricted road in section 82(1), leaving no inconsistency with a direction under section 82(2)(b).
6. The predecessor legislation was treated as neutral and did not determine the issue. The transitional provisions did not require a different construction.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated was allowed. The decision of District Judge Morgan at Redditch Magistrates’ Court was displaced, and the questions in the case stated were answered no, yes and yes.