R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Robinson (Robinson, Ex parte)

A claimant who fears Convention persecution in one part of the country of nationality is not entitled to refugee status if effective protection is available elsewhere in that country and it is reasonable to expect relocation there. Reasonableness depends on all the circumstances. The practical question is whether relocation would be unduly harsh.

Appellate authorities exercising jurisdiction under the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 must determine internal-relocation issues as part of the Convention inquiry. They must apply Convention law to the established facts even where the claimant has omitted a legal argument. They need not search for merely arguable points, but must act on an obvious point favourable to the claimant which has a strong prospect of success.

The applicant, a Tamil from northern Sri Lanka, claimed asylum after detention by government security forces and pressure from the LTTE. A special adjudicator accepted his credibility but found that he would not face a well-founded fear of Convention persecution in Colombo. The adjudicator dismissed his appeal without separately addressing whether it would be reasonable to expect him to settle there.

The Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused leave to appeal. The applicant's grounds had challenged his safety in Colombo and the adjudicator's reasoning, but had not raised reasonableness as a separate internal-relocation issue. Popplewell J refused leave to seek judicial review. The Court of Appeal subsequently permitted a renewed application and directed that the substantive application be heard before it.

The central questions were the content of the internal flight alternative, the Tribunal's jurisdiction under the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, and the circumstances in which an adjudicator or the Tribunal must address a favourable Convention-law point which the claimant has not raised.

1. Disposition. The Court of Appeal, comprising Lord Woolf MR, Potter and Brooke LJJ, dismissed the application in a single judgment primarily prepared by Brooke LJ. The omitted internal-relocation argument was far from an obvious point having a strong prospect of success on the adjudicator's findings.
2. Internal relocation. International refugee protection is surrogate protection. If the claimant's home state can provide effective protection in another part of its territory, international protection is unnecessary. That conclusion applies only where it is reasonable to expect the claimant to travel to and remain in that area. Otherwise the fear of persecution may properly be regarded as extending to the country as a whole.
3. Reasonableness. The decision-maker must consider all the circumstances against the Convention context. Relevant matters include practical accessibility, serious physical danger during travel or residence, undue hardship, and whether the available protection meets basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights. The practical formulation is whether it would be unduly harsh to expect relocation to the less hostile area. Mere dislike of local conditions, lack of friends or relatives, or difficulty obtaining suitable work will not necessarily suffice.
4. Appellate jurisdiction. Internal relocation directly affects whether removal would breach the Convention. Special adjudicators and the Tribunal therefore have jurisdiction under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 to decide it. Paragraph 343 of the Immigration Rules (HC 395 of 1994) expresses the converse of paragraph 334: where no reasonable internal protection exists, the claimant may be entitled to recognition as a refugee.
5. Unraised legal points. Appellate authorities must apply their knowledge of Convention jurisprudence to the facts they establish. Their consideration is not confined to the legal arguments advanced by the asylum-seeker. The restrictive implication of Anandanadarajah v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1996] Imm AR 514 was not followed. Nevertheless, the authorities need not search for new points or seek submissions on points which are merely arguable.
6. Leave threshold. An adjudicator should apply a readily discernible and favourable point of Convention law which has a strong prospect of success. If such an obvious point is absent from the adjudicator's decision, the Tribunal should grant leave to appeal. Leave to seek judicial review of a Tribunal refusal should be granted where it is properly arguable that an omitted point had a strong prospect of success.
7. Application. The relevant conditions in Colombo were those prevailing when each appellate authority made its decision. The adjudicator's findings excluded the asserted risk of Convention persecution there. The remaining evidence about accommodation, relatives, employment and support did not disclose an obvious internal-relocation point requiring the Tribunal to grant leave. The application was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

• Court of Appeal: On 11 October 1996, granted leave to renew the judicial review application and directed a substantive hearing before the court. On 11 July 1997, in the judgment reported as [1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dismissed the application.
• High Court: On 10 May 1996, Popplewell J dismissed the application for leave to seek judicial review of the Tribunal's refusal of leave.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: On 11 April 1996, refused leave to appeal from the special adjudicator.
• Special adjudicator: On 13 March 1996, dismissed the applicant's appeal against refusal of leave to enter following rejection of his asylum claim.