Campisi, R (on the application of) v London Borough Of Southwark

Once a local authority has discharged its homelessness duty by offering suitable accommodation, a further duty arises only if a material change makes the accommodation unsuitable or reopens the statutory question. A bare request for reconsideration is insufficient. The authority must distinguish a repetitious claim from a fresh claim by examining genuinely new material, disregarding material that is insignificant, incredible or was available when the first decision was made. Whether a material change has occurred involves evaluative judgment, so it is not a precedent-fact question for the court. The categorisation decision is reviewable on Wednesbury grounds. In a borderline case, the authority must address the material-change question rationally; later reconstruction cannot cure a failure to make that assessment.

Miss Campisi became homeless through domestic violence and was accepted as unintentionally homeless and in priority need. The local authority accepted that it owed her a duty under section 65(2) of the Housing Act 1985 and offered suitable accommodation, which she accepted.

Before moving in, she relied on worsening mobility, a possible operation and the need to live near assistance. The authority rejected her contention that these matters created a fresh duty. A Deputy High Court Judge sustained her judicial review challenge. The appeal concerned whether the later material required reconsideration, the proper test for distinguishing a fresh claim from a repetitious claim, and whether the authority had actually addressed that issue.

1. Disposition. Schiemann LJ delivered the first judgment. Mummery LJ and Peter Gibson LJ agreed. The appeal was dismissed unanimously, with costs and legal aid taxation of the respondent’s costs.
2. The suitable offer of Larnaca House discharged the duty under section 65(2) when accepted. Consistently with R v Ealing London Borough Council ex parte McBain [1985] 1 WLR 1351, a further duty could arise if circumstances later materially changed.
3. A repeat application may be repetitious or fresh. A repetitious claim requires no further action. A fresh claim attracts the substantive and procedural consequences of an initial claim. A mere assertion that reconsideration is required cannot impose a continuing accommodation duty while new inquiries are undertaken.
4. For categorisation purposes, the authority may begin with the assumption that its first suitability decision was correct. It may disregard material that is insignificant, incredible or was available when the first claim was determined. It must then assess whether the remaining new material gives reason to believe that the homelessness decision should be reversed. The evaluation of significance and credibility means that the issue is not a precedent-fact question. The authority’s decision that there has been no material change is reviewable only on ordinary Wednesbury grounds, as reflected in R v London Borough of Tower Hamlets ex parte Saber 24th HLR 611.
5. On the facts, the medical material was capable in law of amounting to a material change. The authority’s response did not address that central question, and its affidavits did not provide a reasoned assessment made at the relevant time. The Deputy High Court Judge was therefore right to intervene, and the case was to go back for proper consideration.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [1998] EWCA Civ 1188: dismissed the appeal with costs.
• High Court of Justice, Mr G Moriarty QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge — citation not stated in the judgment: sustained Miss Campisi’s judicial review challenge to the authority’s rejection.