Hobhouse v Hobhouse

Appellate courts should be slow to interfere with an ancillary financial-relief award made in the exercise of a trial judge’s wide discretion. A judge may assess future residence and financial dependency by drawing fair inferences from the evidence and surrounding circumstances, even where the conclusion is necessarily predictive. Individual components of a lump-sum award should not be isolated from the overall package. The statutory criteria do not necessarily produce an obvious bracket or a single correct figure. An award should stand where the judge’s reasoning is careful, the conclusions are supported by the evidence, and the result falls within the discretionary range.

The parties married in 1993 and the marriage was childless and brief. The wife had substantial inherited assets and prospective interests in Australia, while the husband had considerably greater inherited wealth. Following the divorce, the wife sought capital provision sufficient to maintain an English home until a prospective inheritance, whereas the husband argued that she could return to Australia and resume her former life.

After a three-day hearing, Connell J awarded the wife a lump sum of £175,000. The wife appealed, challenging the finding that she would probably return to Australia within three to five years, the provision made for English housing, and the absence of provision for separate Australian housing before her anticipated inheritance.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Thorpe LJ gave the first judgment, with Mummery LJ and Butler-Sloss LJ agreeing.

1. Future residence. The finding that the wife was likely to return to Australia in about three to five years was an inferential and necessarily predictive assessment. It was fairly reached from the evidence, including her Australian roots, family connections, qualifications, employment investigations, and ambivalent oral evidence. The judge was entitled to reject both the husband’s case that she could return immediately and the wife’s case that England would remain her permanent home until inheritance.
2. Housing provision. The wife’s calculation that the £75,000 housing allowance provided only £15,000 per year was unjustified. The judge had not calculated the provision by simple division, and the allowance could support a higher annual rent over the relevant period. He had also recognised that she might rent or buy using her own funds.
3. Overall assessment. It was dangerous to concentrate on individual items within a lump-sum award. The wife was not confined to the compartments used by the judge to construct the total award. The overall sum gave her room to adjust how the money was spent.
4. Australian housing. The wife’s case that separate housing in Australia should be funded for the period before inheritance had not been put clearly before the judge. In any event, the judgment contained an inferential finding that, on returning to Australia, she would live at the family estate and therefore would not require separate accommodation.
5. Discretion. In a case involving inherited wealth, a brief childless marriage, and uncertain future dependency, the Section 25 criteria did not produce an obvious bracket or a likely single award. The judge’s carefully explained figure was within the wide discretionary range and was above criticism. The appeal was dismissed with the respondent’s standard costs; there was no order for costs on the respondent’s notice.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [1998] EWCA Civ 1970. The wife’s appeal was dismissed, with the respondent awarded standard costs.
• High Court of Justice, Family Division: Connell J awarded the wife a lump sum of £175,000 following the ancillary-relief hearing.