Bariise, R (on the application of) v London Borough Of Brent

In deciding whether a person became intentionally homeless, a local housing authority must assess the individual circumstances and whether it was reasonable to continue occupying the accommodation. It may have regard to general housing conditions in the district. The authority is not required to make every further inquiry that might be desirable. Intervention is justified only where no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the inquiries made, or where a necessary inquiry was omitted. A conclusion that accommodation remains reasonable is not irrational merely because the applicant’s complaints are serious, if the authority is entitled from its local experience to regard the circumstances as within the ordinary conditions prevailing in the district.

The Council decided that Mrs Bariise was intentionally homeless after she voluntarily left shared accommodation occupied with her two young children. She complained of poor hygiene, theft of food and harsh treatment of the children by other occupants. The Council concluded that it would have been reasonable for her to remain and that she had left without securing alternative accommodation.

Popplewell J quashed the decision. He considered that the Council had failed to give sufficient individual consideration to her circumstances and had not carried out the required balancing exercise. The Council appealed, raising the adequacy of its inquiries and the alleged failure to assess the particular case.

1. Appeal allowed. The order of Popplewell J was set aside. The Council’s decision that the respondent was intentionally homeless was restored. There was no order for costs, subject to legal aid taxation.
2. Lord Justice Millett held that the Council had considered the matter on several occasions. It had before it the respondent’s translated letter, her solicitors’ detailed letters and the relevant allegations. There was no prima facie reason to believe that further investigation would produce additional favourable evidence.
3. The duty under Housing Act 1985, s 62(1), required the Council to make the inquiries necessary to satisfy itself on intentional homelessness. It did not require every inquiry that might have been sensible or desirable. The relevant threshold was whether no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the inquiries made, or whether the Council had failed to make an inquiry which no reasonable authority could have regarded as unnecessary.
4. The statutory question was whether, in all the circumstances, it would have been reasonable for the respondent to continue to occupy the accommodation. The Council was entitled to consider the general housing circumstances in the Borough under ss 58(2B) and 60(4), while also considering the respondent’s individual complaints and personal circumstances.
5. The Council was not required to express astonishment or provide separate detailed reasoning on every matter. If an allegation were so startling that it would ordinarily require individual comment, silence might support an inference that it had not been properly considered. Here, the Panel’s failure to react with astonishment did not establish inadequate consideration.
6. The seriousness of the complaints and whether they took the case outside the ordinary conditions were matters for the Panel’s assessment, informed by its experience of housing conditions in Brent. The Court of Appeal could not properly conclude that the decision was perverse.

Lord Justice Schiemann and Sir Brian Neill agreed with Lord Justice Millett.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [1998] EWCA Civ 209 — appeal allowed and the order below set aside.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Popplewell J quashed the Council’s decision and ordered reconsideration with attention to the respondent’s individual circumstances.