R v Chief Constable of the North Wales Police, Ex p AB (R v Chief Constable of the North Wales Police, Ex parte Thorpe, Thorpe, Ex parte)

Before disclosing information identifying a former sexual offender, the police must act fairly. Disclosure requires a pressing need, a proper assessment of risk and as much relevant information as is reasonably practicable. The person concerned will often be able to provide material information and should normally be given an opportunity to comment on the gist of adverse information, subject to urgency, confidentiality and the overriding need to protect children and other vulnerable people.

Police disclosure engages the balance reflected in Article 8. Public availability of convictions does not permit unrestricted official publication. Information acquired for police functions may be used where, having considered the individual’s interests, the police reasonably conclude that disclosure is required to protect the public. A published policy is an important safeguard against arbitrary action.

Two former sex offenders appealed from the Divisional Court’s dismissal of their applications for judicial review, reported at [1997] 3 WLR 724. North Wales Police had disclosed press material concerning their convictions to the manager of a caravan site where they were living, following multi-agency assessments that they posed a high risk to children.

The appellants no longer pursued their earlier claims based on harassment, confidence and misfeasance. They argued instead that the police had acted unfairly by relying on adverse information from another police force without allowing them to correct it. They also challenged the disclosure by reference to Article 8 and irrationality. The central question was what procedural and substantive limits governed police disclosure of information about former sexual offenders for child protection.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that neither the police policy nor the particular disclosure was unlawful. No relief was appropriate.

2. The police owed a duty to act fairly when considering disclosure. Each case depended on its facts, but disclosure of a former sexual offender’s identity was highly sensitive and should occur only where there was a pressing need. The police had to obtain as much relevant information as was reasonably practicable. In the ordinary case, the person at risk of disclosure would be well placed to contribute information bearing on risk and should be given an opportunity to comment on the gist of adverse material.

3. The police should in this case have disclosed the gist of the Northumbria report, and should at least have considered disclosing the report itself. No reason had been shown why this could not have been done. However, the probation officers had corrected inaccuracies in the report and still assessed the appellants as presenting a high risk. The court was not persuaded that further representations by them would have changed the outcome. The procedural deficiency therefore justified no relief.

4. Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights informed the applicable public-law balance, although the Convention was not then part of domestic law. A conviction being in the public domain did not entitle the police, as a public authority, to publish information without a public interest requiring it. Police could use information held for their functions where they reasonably concluded, after considering the individual’s interests, that this was required to protect the public, especially children. The court approved the principle of reasonable police use explained in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804.

5. The operational decision was not irrational. It was supported by other agencies, made for child protection and taken conscientiously in a difficult situation. The later Home Office guidance was an improvement, particularly in its emphasis on obtaining the offender’s account where practicable and securing suitable accommodation, but that did not render the earlier policy or action unlawful.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the dismissal of judicial review.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court: dismissed the applications for judicial review: [1997] 3 WLR 724.