Wood v West Midlands Police

A police authority does not obtain qualified privilege merely because it is pursuing crime prevention or because the recipient has a commercial interest in the information. Damaging information should be disclosed only for the purpose, and to the extent, necessary for a public duty or to enable another public body to perform one. The decision requires careful, case-specific judgment, appropriate seniority, safeguards and a specific public-interest justification. Factual reporting of an arrest or charge may be permissible, but unconvicted criminality should not be anticipated and collateral defamatory allegations require secure information and separate justification. Official guidance may help define the duty. A late amendment adding a related cause of action may be allowed where it arises from the same facts and the court has fairly weighed limitation, delay and prejudice.

Ben Wood brought defamation proceedings against the Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police concerning letters sent by a police officer about Gary Hart’s alleged vehicle-related criminality. Although the letters did not name Mr Wood, he alleged that they identified him as involved in Hart’s criminal activities through Vehicle Salvage Group.

Tugendhat J, in the High Court under [2003] EWHC 2971 (QB), struck out the defence of qualified privilege as having no real prospect of success. During the jury trial, the judge permitted a very late amendment adding a claim in slander based on a preceding telephone conversation. The jury found for Mr Wood and awarded £45,000.

The appeal concerned qualified privilege, the amendment adding slander after expiry of the limitation period, and damages contingently upon success on those issues.

Lord Justice May gave the judgment of the court. Dyson and Wall LJJ agreed. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Qualified privilege. The Chief Constable had to establish a sufficient legal, social or moral duty or interest to publish and a corresponding interest or duty in the recipients. The public duties of the police were relevant to that question. Applying the approach in Thorpe v Chief Constable of North Wales Police [1999] QB 396, damaging information obtained by the police should generally be disclosed only for the purpose, and to the extent, necessary to perform a public duty or to enable another public body to perform one. Disclosure required careful consideration of the particular facts, appropriate seniority, safeguards and a specific public-interest justification.
2. Application. Hart had been arrested and charged but had not been convicted. The police had no business or duty to anticipate his conviction. There was no secure information that VSG or Mr Wood was complicit in his alleged criminality, and the stolen vehicles had been found at Hart’s home. The insurers and insurance organisations were not sufficiently potential victims of crime to create the necessary reciprocity of interest. The disclosures were ill-considered, indiscriminate, commercially damaging and disproportionate. The 1978 Guidelines and the finding under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999 provided no support for a duty to volunteer the information. The qualified-privilege defence therefore failed. The decision was confined to its particular facts, particularly because the Human Rights Act 1998, Data Protection Act 1998 and section 115 of the Police Act 1997 had subsequently come into force.
3. Late amendment. The judge had to consider the discretionary power under section 32 A of the Limitation Act 1980, the same-facts condition in rule 17.4(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, and the general discretion concerning amendments. The telephone conversation was intrinsic to the narrative leading to the letter and relevant to whether the letter referred to Mr Wood. The condition in rule 17.4(2) was therefore satisfied. The factors under the different sources of discretion were substantially the same and were encompassed by section 32 A. The judge had addressed the substance of the issue and reached a tenable, though hesitant, conclusion. There was no basis for appellate interference. The contingent challenge to damages did not arise.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On limited permission, dismissed the appeal concerning qualified privilege and the amendment adding slander. The conditional issue concerning damages did not arise. [2004] EWCA Civ 1638
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Tugendhat J struck out the defence of qualified privilege, permitted a late amendment adding slander, and left the case to the jury, which awarded £45,000. [2003] EWHC 2971 (QB)