Goode v Martin

Under Human Rights Act 1998, section 3(1), CPR 17.4(2) may be read compatibly with article 6(1) so as to permit a time-barred amendment based on facts already in issue in the action, including facts pleaded by the defendant. A contrary construction unjustifiably impedes access to the court where no new factual case is introduced and the amendment merely alleges that the defendant was negligent even on the defendant’s account of events.

The court may adopt a linguistically strained interpretation, including by implication, where that is possible and necessary to avoid incompatibility with Convention rights.

The claimant suffered serious head injuries while sailing on the defendant’s yacht. Her original pleading alleged that a defective mainsheet traveller car caused the accident. The defendant’s later amended defence advanced a materially different factual account, asserting that she was struck by the mainsheet while helping during a gybe.

After the primary limitation period had expired, the claimant sought to amend her statement of claim to allege that the defendant was negligent even if his factual account were accepted. Master Miller refused permission because he considered that CPR 17.4(2) gave him no jurisdiction. Colman J dismissed her appeal and also rejected an alternative argument concerning her date of knowledge under the Limitation Act 1980.

On this second appeal, the central issue was whether CPR 17.4(2) permitted the proposed amendment, consistently with article 6(1).

Decision

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously. Brooke LJ gave the reasoned judgment, with which Latham and Kay LJJ agreed. The claimant was permitted to amend her statement of claim.

2. CPR 17.4(2) had to be construed in light of section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Following the interpretative approach described in R v A [2001] UKHL 251, section 3(1) can require a strained reading and the implication of words. The rule was therefore read as allowing an amendment where the new claim arose from the same facts, or substantially the same facts, as are already in issue on a claim in the proceedings.

3. That construction covered facts put in issue by the defendant’s defence. The proposed alternative plea introduced no new factual case. It accepted, for the purpose of the plea, the defendant’s own account and alleged that those facts nevertheless established negligence.

4. A narrower construction would impede the claimant’s access to the court under article 6(1). Applying the principles cited from Ashingdene v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528, the court held that the restriction had no legitimate aim on these facts. In any event, it would not be a reasonably proportionate means of achieving such an aim. The claimant should not be forced to bring a separate, costly action merely because the defendant’s factual account had been pleaded after limitation had expired.

5. Brooke LJ also considered that Colman J had correctly rejected the claimant’s alternative argument under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. Service of the amended defence did not make that date of knowledge unarguable, because the defendant could contend that reasonable diligence would earlier have obtained the relevant facts.

The court directed an early case management conference and awarded the claimant the costs of the appeal, with £12,000 on account.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Allowed the claimant’s second appeal in Goode v Martin [2001] EWCA Civ 1899, permitting the proposed amendment.

• High Court (Admiralty Court; Colman J). Dismissed the claimant’s appeal from Master Miller and rejected her additional arguments under sections 35 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980.

• Admiralty Registrar (Master Miller). Refused permission to amend because he considered that the proposed new claim did not arise from the same facts, or substantially the same facts, as the existing claim for CPR 17.4(2).