Best v Charter Medical Of England Ltd & Anor

A claimant in slander must plead the words complained of with reasonable certainty. Pleading only their gist, effect or alleged defamatory meaning will not normally disclose a viable cause of action.

A narrow exception permits the court to order further information where credible evidence shows that the defendant made a defamatory statement of a specified nature, on a particular occasion and to a particular person. The procedure cannot be used to discover whether any cause of action exists.

The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 did not displace these principles. The words “so far as possible” in the relevant practice direction encapsulate the established exception and do not permit speculative pleading.

A consultant psychiatrist sued the owner of a hospital and its deputy medical director for several alleged oral publications concerning his mental health and fitness to practise. The re-amended particulars generally alleged statements “to the effect that” specified imputations had been made, while leaving many speakers, recipients, dates and actual words unidentified.

Gray J held that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action. He regarded the allegations as speculative and struck out the re-amended particulars.

The claimant appealed. The central issues were whether pleading the gist or effect of alleged words satisfied the requirements of a slander claim, whether further information could cure the deficiencies, and whether the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 had relaxed the established pleading standard.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Keene LJ delivered the judgment, with which Robert Walker LJ and Peter Gibson LJ agreed. The re-amended particulars were too vague and speculative to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
2. The words alleged to have been published are facts essential to a defamation claim. They must be pleaded with reasonable certainty so that the defendant can assess their meaning and decide whether to deny defamatory meaning or plead a defence such as justification or fair comment. It is ordinarily insufficient to plead merely that words were spoken “to the effect that” a claimant possessed a discreditable characteristic. Such a formulation pleads an asserted meaning rather than the words from which that meaning arises.
3. There is a narrow and rarely applicable exception. A claimant who cannot identify the precise words may obtain further information where credible evidence establishes a good cause of action: the defendant must have made a defamatory statement of a specified nature on a particular occasion and to a particular person. The procedure may complete the particulars of an existing claim. It cannot be used as a fishing expedition to discover whether a claim exists.
4. The statement of truth required by rule 22.1 did not establish a prima facie claim. The claimant had not heard any of the alleged publications and identified no direct witness evidence supporting them. The documentary material did not credibly establish the alleged oral publications concerning mental illness. One document referred merely to being unwell; another evidenced concerns or thoughts but no publication; and a third was contradicted by an earlier account.
5. The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 did not materially alter the established approach. The requirement for reasonable precision arose from substantive features of defamation law, particularly the importance of the actual words to meaning and available defences. Paragraph 2.4 of the practice direction to Part 53, including the phrase “so far as possible”, succinctly preserved the established principles and their narrow exception.
6. The order striking out the re-amended particulars was upheld. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The claimant’s appeal was dismissed unanimously. The order striking out the re-amended particulars was upheld, with costs, and permission to appeal was refused: [2001] EWCA Civ 1588.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: On 20 June 2000 Gray J allowed the defendants’ appeal and struck out the re-amended particulars because they disclosed no reasonable cause of action. No citation is stated in the judgment.