Bode v Mundell (Rev 1)

In defamation claims, precise pleading and proof of the words published remain essential, especially in slander claims based on alleged conversations. A claimant must also show, on the balance of probabilities, that publication caused or is likely to cause serious harm to reputation; serious defamatory tendency alone is insufficient. The serious-harm issue is fact-sensitive, but may be resolved summarily where the evidence could not realistically establish the threshold. The court may also terminate proceedings as an abuse of process where the likely benefit, including vindication or an injunction, is disproportionate to the resources required and the protection of reputation at stake.

The claimant, an astrophysics professor, brought slander and libel claims against a former colleague concerning allegations about a reference given to a colleague, the handling of a disciplinary process, and discrimination and victimisation. The slander claims relied on inference from later correspondence rather than evidence from the alleged recipients or a recording. The libel claims concerned written communications allegedly sent to academics and professional contacts in South Africa and elsewhere.

The defendant applied to strike out the Particulars of Claim under CPR 3.4(2) and for summary judgment under CPR Part 24. The issues included pleading and proof of publication, serious harm under Defamation Act 2013, and whether the claims were an abuse of process under Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75.

1. The court struck out extensive factual background in the Particulars of Claim as unnecessary surplusage which tended to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. A claimant need not plead or prove falsity, since falsity is presumed unless truth is pleaded and proved by the defendant.

2. The slander claims were summarily dismissed. Although the pleaded words were sufficiently identified for CPR 53 PD 2.4, the claimant had no real prospect of proving that those precise words had been spoken. The case depended on speculation from later emails and a summary which reproduced the pleaded words. There was no recording, no evidence from the alleged publishees, and no realistic prospect of obtaining evidence capable of proving the words.

3. The slander claims also had no real prospect of establishing serious harm. The alleged publication was to one or two individuals, with no evidence of their reaction, no pleaded facts showing the importance of their views to the claimant, and no evidence of republication or a grapevine effect. Inferences of harm must not become a presumption of serious reputational harm.

4. The libel pleading was not struck out. The RKK Email provided a sound basis for inferring written publication of the pleaded words, and disclosure or admissions could fill remaining details. Nevertheless, summary judgment was entered because the evidence did not provide a realistic prospect of proving serious harm. The identified recipients did not say that the claimant’s reputation had been damaged, and the evidence of further republication and rumour was weak and vague.

5. Both claims would independently have constituted Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones Inc abuse. The publications were small-scale, the likely issue was malice in the context of possible qualified privilege, and there was no evidence that litigation was needed for vindication or an injunction. The expense and use of court resources would have been disproportionate.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.