Umeyor v Ibe

In a slander claim, the claimant must prove the actual words spoken and, where they were spoken in a foreign language, the words and their English translation. Lay evidence of meaning cannot replace reliable evidence of the words and expert translation where translation is disputed.

An imputation of sexual immorality is not generally actionable as slander. Words imputing criminal conduct may be actionable without proof of special damage even if the conduct occurred abroad, where it would constitute a serious crime under English law and the law of a civilised country. The claimant must nevertheless prove serious harm under the Defamation Act 2013. A community meeting concerning the use of union funds was an occasion of qualified privilege, and provocative or careless speech did not establish malice.

The claimant sued for slander arising from words allegedly spoken by the defendant at a meeting of a Nigerian community association in London. He alleged that the defendant accused him of using union funds to buy prostitutes in Nigeria. The defendant denied using those words and contended that he had referred only to questionable documentation and the possible misuse of union funds.

The claim also relied on the exceptions to the general rule requiring proof of special damage, the serious-harm requirement under the Defamation Act 2013, qualified privilege and malice. The central issues were whether the words alleged had been proved, whether they were actionable as slander, whether the meeting was privileged, and whether the defendant had acted maliciously.

1. Proof of publication. The claimant failed to prove the Ibo words alleged, or any words bearing the pleaded meaning. In a foreign-language defamation claim the actual words and their translation must be proved. The witnesses’ evidence concerned only the alleged English substance and did not provide reliable expert translation evidence. The defendant was found to have made materially different remarks concerning questionable receipts, possible misuse of union money and a possible extra-marital liaison. The difference was substantive, and amendment would not fairly have been allowed.
2. Actionability. Even if the pleaded words had been proved, an allegation of sexual immorality was not actionable as slander generally or on the facts. Nor would it have disparaged the claimant in his political office. The court treated the relevant question as whether the words were likely in fact to cause substantial professional disparagement, assessed objectively.
3. Words imputing theft could in principle be actionable without proof of special damage. The relevant question was what the ordinary listener understood the words to allege, rather than the precise facts of the claimant’s transactions. The rule was not confined to conduct prosecutable in England. Nevertheless, the words actually spoken did not amount to an accusation of theft, and serious harm was not proved. Any harm from the suggestion of financial wrongdoing had substantially been undone by the later judgment vindicating the claimant from actual dishonesty.
4. Privilege and malice. The meeting was an occasion of qualified privilege because members shared a legitimate interest in the use of union funds and the related litigation. A statement did not lose privilege merely because it was logically irrelevant; it had to be wholly extraneous to the occasion. References to possible misuse of union money remained sufficiently connected. The defendant’s anger, haste, inadequate investigation and intemperate manner did not prove a dominant improper motive. The claim was dismissed.