ABC (A Mother) v The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (Rev 1)

In a slander claim, the claimant must prove the precise words published, their defamatory meaning, and serious harm to reputation under Defamation Act 2013, section 1. Publication of a single defamatory word may be sufficient, and an imputation of an imprisonable offence may make spoken words actionable without proof of special damage. However, serious allegations do not automatically establish serious reputational harm. The court must assess the evidence and may draw reasonable inferences, but cannot treat speculative future dissemination as proof of likely serious harm. Communications by police to social services about child-protection investigations may attract qualified privilege where there is a reciprocal duty or legitimate interest, subject to Article 8 proportionality and malice.

The claimant brought a slander claim against the Chief Constable arising from allegations that police officers had conveyed defamatory statements about her to social services. A health visitor subsequently recorded information from a social worker in the child’s GP record. The claimant alleged that the record showed that an officer had accused her of lying to the police, perverting the course of justice, and being criminally implicated in the events.

The court had to determine whether the alleged words were published by the officers, whether they were defamatory and actionable in slander, whether serious harm to reputation had been caused or was likely, and whether the defendant had established truth or qualified privilege.

1. Publication. The claimant failed to prove publication of most of the words complained of. The GP record was an account by a health visitor of what the social worker had said, not a direct record of an officer’s words. The claimant did prove that Detective Constable Green had told the social worker that she had “lied”, referring to statements made during a telephone conversation.
2. Defamatory meaning and actionability. In context, “lied” meant that the claimant had deliberately told a falsehood to a police officer during an investigation into possible child sexual abuse. That meaning was defamatory. The judge would have been inclined to find that the imputation amounted to an imprisonable offence, either perverting the course of public justice or wasting police time contrary to section 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, making the slander actionable without proof of special damage.
3. Serious harm. The claimant failed to establish that publication had caused or was likely to cause serious harm to reputation as required by section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013. The record’s existence did not establish actual reputational harm. Possible future effects on employment, fostering, adoption, or family life were speculative, and there was no sufficient basis to infer widespread circulation.
4. Defences. Although truth was not proved, the communication was made on an occasion of qualified privilege. The police had a duty to communicate relevant information to social services, and social services had a corresponding duty to receive it in the safeguarding context. The communication was proportionate and there was no proof of malice, since Green honestly believed that the claimant had lied.
5. The claim was dismissed. No financial remedy or injunction arose.