Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd & Anor

In libel proceedings, the capability of words to bear a pleaded defamatory meaning is governed by reasonableness. The court must consider what a representative reasonable reader could understand in context. It must exclude any meaning produced only by a strained, forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation. A merely possible understanding by some reader is insufficient.

Meaning ordinarily belongs to the trial tribunal, but a judge must determine capability on an appropriate preliminary application. An innuendo based on extrinsic facts adds nothing unless those facts connect the claimant with the defamatory implication alleged.

Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd & Anor concerned a libel claim arising from words and a photograph published on a magazine cover and reproduced in a newspaper advertisement. The claimant alleged that the material meant either that she was a man posing as a woman or that she was transgender or transsexual and had been born male. She alternatively relied on rumours about the proposed introduction of a transgender or transsexual participant into the television programme in which she had previously appeared.

Eady J struck out the relevant particulars of claim because no reasonable reader could attribute either pleaded meaning to the words. The claim was consequently dismissed. The central issue on appeal was whether the words were capable of bearing the pleaded natural and ordinary or innuendo meanings.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Sir Anthony Clarke MR delivered the judgment, with Tuckey and Jacob LJJ agreeing. Eady J had correctly concluded that neither pleaded meaning was reasonably available.
2. The court’s preliminary function. Meaning is ordinarily determined by the jury in a jury trial or by the judge in a non-jury trial. On an appropriate application, however, the judge has a duty to decide whether the words are capable of bearing the defamatory meaning alleged. The question is whether a finding of that meaning by the trial tribunal would be perverse. The appellate reluctance to interfere is less marked where the first-instance judge has found the words incapable of the meaning, because that ruling prevents the issue from reaching the trial tribunal: Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2001] EWCA Civ 1263 applied.
3. The reasonable-reader principles. The governing principle is reasonableness. The hypothetical reader is neither naïve nor unduly suspicious. The reader may read between the lines and engage in some loose thinking, but is not avid for scandal and does not select a defamatory meaning where reasonable non-defamatory meanings are available. Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided; the publisher’s intention is irrelevant; the publication must be read as a whole; and the reader must represent the publication’s actual readership. A meaning available only through a strained, forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation must be excluded. The principles in Skuse v Granada Television Limited [1996] EMLR 278 and Neville v Fine Arts Company [1897] AC 68 were applied.
4. Application to the cover material. The words, photograph, intended readership, reality-television setting and indication that the item introduced the claimant’s own story provided no reasonable basis for understanding that she was male, was posing as a woman or had undergone gender transition. Treating a nickname as establishing either pleaded meaning required an irrational and fanciful interpretation. Any finding of the alleged meanings would therefore have been perverse.
5. Innuendo. The pleaded rumours concerned the future introduction of an unidentified transgender or transsexual participant. The claimant did not plead that readers believed she was that participant. The extrinsic facts therefore supplied no connection between her and the alleged implication and added nothing to the natural and ordinary meaning case.
6. Issue left open. It was unnecessary to decide whether the cover line and the internal article formed one publication which had to be read together. The principles discussed in Charleston v News Group Newspapers Limited [1995] 2 AC 65 were consequently not considered.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). In Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 130, the court unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the striking out and dismissal of the claim.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division. Eady J struck out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the particulars of claim because the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meanings. He consequently dismissed the claim and refused permission to appeal.