Stocker v Stocker

The natural and ordinary meaning of an allegedly defamatory statement is the impression it would convey to the ordinary reasonable reader, assessed in its complete context. Dictionary definitions cannot dictate that meaning or displace the court’s assessment of ordinary usage.

Social-media communications require an impressionistic approach which reflects their casual, conversational and rapidly read character. Courts should avoid elaborate parsing or selecting a strained meaning.

An appellate court may determine meaning afresh where the trial judge’s conclusion was vitiated by legal error. Otherwise, it should exercise disciplined restraint. Under section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952, a justification defence succeeds where any unproved charges cause no material additional injury in light of the substantial truth of the remaining allegations.

Stocker v Stocker concerned a Facebook exchange in which the appellant told her former husband’s new partner that he had tried to strangle her. She also referred to threats, gun issues, arrests and breach of a non-molestation order. The respondent brought defamation proceedings.

Mitting J treated dictionary definitions as delimiting the available meanings. He held that the words alleged an attempt to kill and that the appellant had failed to justify the resulting allegation of dangerousness. The Court of Appeal, [2018] EWCA Civ 170, upheld that decision, reasoning that the dictionary had caused no harm and had merely been used as a check.

The central issues before the Supreme Court were the correct natural and ordinary meaning of the Facebook post, whether the trial judge’s approach disclosed an error of law, and whether the defence under section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 was established.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Kerr delivered the judgment, with which Lord Reed, Lady Black, Lord Briggs and Lord Kitchin agreed. The trial judge had committed an error of law by allowing dictionary definitions to dictate or delimit the possible meaning of the Facebook post. The Court of Appeal was wrong to characterise the dictionary’s use as a mere cross-check.

2. The natural and ordinary meaning of a publication depends on the impression conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader. The criteria in Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130 were applied. The words must be considered together and in their full context. The court must avoid technical linguistic analysis, over-elaborate parsing and meanings which arise only through a strained or forced interpretation.

3. The medium is an important part of the context. Facebook posts and similar social-media communications are casual and conversational. Users commonly scroll through them quickly, receiving a fleeting and impressionistic meaning. The approach to Twitter in Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) was expressly approved and applied by analogy.

4. The ordinary reader would understand “tried to strangle me” to mean that the respondent had grasped the appellant by the throat and applied force to her neck. It would not be understood as alleging a deliberate attempt to kill. Since the trial judge’s contrary conclusion resulted from legal error, the Supreme Court properly determined meaning afresh rather than remitting the case.

5. There was no warrant for adding the meaning that the respondent represented a danger to any woman with whom he might live. In any event, the proved assault, visible neck marks, threats and breach of a non-molestation order were more than sufficient to satisfy section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952. Any allegations not proved to the letter caused no material additional injury having regard to what had been proved.

6. In material expressly described as academic to the present decision, the court explained the appellate standard. A finding of defamatory meaning should not be lightly disturbed. The proper approach is disciplined restraint: intervention is justified where the meaning falls outside the range reasonably available or is vitiated by legal error, but not merely because the appellate court prefers another reasonably available meaning. Subject to submissions, the respondent was ordered to bear the costs in the Supreme Court and below.

• United Kingdom Supreme Court: In Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, the court unanimously allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts’ determination of meaning and upheld the justification defence.
• Court of Appeal: In [2018] EWCA Civ 170, the court upheld the trial judge’s conclusions on meaning and justification.
• High Court: Mitting J held that the Facebook words alleged an attempt to kill and that the appellant had not justified the sting of dangerousness. A citation is not stated in the judgment.