Paul Currie v Soho Theatre Company Limited

In determining defamatory meaning, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the hypothetical reasonable reader, reading the publication as a whole and in context. The reader may draw implications more readily than a lawyer, but strained or over-elaborate analysis must be avoided. An attribution of motive or state of mind is not necessarily a statement of fact. Its classification as fact or opinion depends on context. A document setting out the publisher’s position, containing evaluative language and referring to an incomplete investigation may reasonably convey opinion rather than a definitive factual allegation. On appeal, disciplined restraint is required. Intervention is justified for legal error or a meaning outside the reasonably available range, not merely because another permissible meaning is preferred.

After an incident following the appellant’s comedy show, the respondent published a press release alleging that Jewish audience members had been verbally abused and aggressively asked to leave. The appellant brought a libel claim. At a preliminary-issues hearing, Nicklin J determined the natural and ordinary meaning, classified the relevant allegations as fact or opinion, and found the whole meaning defamatory. His decision is reported at [2025] EWHC 1645 (KB).

The appellant appealed, seeking to add to the factual meaning an express attribution that the conduct occurred because the audience members were Jewish. The central issues were whether that attribution was necessarily factual, whether the first-instance judge applied the correct approach to implication and fact or opinion, and whether his conclusion was outside the range reasonably open to him.

1. Appeal dismissed. Singh LJ gave the leading judgment and Coulson LJ agreed. The meaning adopted by Nicklin J was reasonably open to him and involved no error of law.
2. Appellate restraint. Applying the approach in Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, and its application to fact-or-opinion classifications in Blake v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000, an appellate court must exercise disciplined restraint. It must not interfere merely because it prefers another conclusion within the reasonably available range. It may intervene where the first-instance conclusion contains legal error or falls outside that range.
3. Meaning and context. The court applied the principles stated in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Limited [2019] EWHC 48 (QB). The publication had to be read as a whole, in context and having regard to its mode of publication. The court accepted that the press release implicitly conveyed that the appellant had acted because the audience members were, or were perceived to be, Jewish. That did not determine whether the attribution was fact or opinion.
4. Motive and state of mind. Following the contextual approach in Pena v Tameside Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2011] EWHC 3027 (QB) and Branson v Bower [2001] EWCA Civ 791, an attribution of motive may be fact or comment depending on context. The respondent’s press release was principally a statement of its position, contained clear evaluative language, and referred to an investigation that was continuing, including police involvement. An ordinary reasonable reader could therefore understand the relevant passage as expressing the respondent’s opinion rather than making a definitive factual allegation. It was not internally inconsistent to treat the conduct as antisemitic in opinion while treating the implied motive as opinion.
5. The judge had read the press release as a whole and had not adopted an unduly lawyerly or compartmentalised approach. The appeal therefore failed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the preliminary meaning and fact-or-opinion findings.
2. High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division: Nicklin J determined the preliminary issues in the appellant’s libel claim and gave judgment at [2025] EWHC 1645 (KB).