Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd

Natural and ordinary meaning is determined objectively through the eyes of the reasonable reader, who reads a book as a whole and is neither naïve nor avid for scandal. The court must identify one meaning, without over-elaborate textual analysis.

A reader’s own moral conclusion that conduct was dishonest or criminal does not become part of the publication’s meaning unless it is conveyed by the author. Under the repetition rule, a reported regulatory or employer conclusion must be translated into the underlying factual allegation. Where a book presents a distinct account of conduct without expressing an evaluative view of it, that imputation is one of fact, not opinion.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning passages in The Spider Network, a book about manipulation of the Libor rate. He alleged that the book accused him of criminal and dishonest conspiracy, and of being sanctioned by the Financial Conduct Authority and dismissed by UBS because of that misconduct.

The defendant contended that, read as a whole, the book alleged only that the claimant participated in collusive attempts to move Libor for trading advantage. It also contended that any further criticism was opinion. Deputy Master Bard ordered trial of preliminary issues concerning meaning and whether any relevant words were statements of opinion.

1. The preliminary issues were determined in favour of a factual, but materially narrower, defamatory meaning. The court read the book as a whole and assessed its broad impression on the reasonable reader. The reader would understand that Libor manipulation was widespread, harmful and fostered by institutional failures. The claimant was not, however, presented as a central participant in the conduct of Tom Hayes or as necessarily criminally culpable.

2. The claimant’s proposed meaning impermissibly attributed to the author evaluative conclusions that the book left to readers. Descriptions such as criminality, dishonesty and the greatest scam were not expressed as the author’s view of the claimant. A reader might reach those judgments, but they would be the reader’s own moral assessment rather than the natural and ordinary meaning.

3. The proposed meanings based on the FCA’s finding and on UBS’s dismissal also breached the repetition rule. The issue was the underlying conduct alleged, rather than a repetition of the conclusions reached by those bodies. The court applied that approach consistently with Brown v Bower [2017] 4 WLR 197 and Miah v BBC [2018] EWHC 1054 (QB).

4. The book’s single defamatory meaning was that the claimant participated, with traders, brokers and bank employees worldwide, in collusive conduct deliberately intended to manipulate Libor for his or his employer’s trading advantage, potentially harming persons and entities whose financial products or services were linked to Libor.

5. That meaning was a statement of fact, not opinion. The book supplied a distinct factual account of the claimant’s activities and did not express an authorial opinion about them. No issue of liability or defence was determined.

High Court (Queen's Bench Division): Deputy Master Bard ordered the trial of preliminary issues on meaning and fact or opinion. The present judgment determined those issues at first instance. No appeal is recorded.