Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd & Ors

The natural and ordinary meaning of an allegedly defamatory publication is the single meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader. The court must assess the broad impression created by the publication as a whole. It should consider the bane and antidote together and avoid an over-elaborate or excessively literal analysis.

A report about a police investigation will commonly convey a lower level of culpability than a publisher’s own investigation because readers understand that the police must investigate reported crime. The available meanings are not confined to rigid categories. A publication may convey grounds for suspicion stronger than merely reasonable grounds without imputing actual guilt.

The claimant police officer brought a libel claim concerning the hardback and paperback editions of the defendants’ book, Bent Coppers. The book recounted allegations that a criminal informant had paid the claimant and another officer £50,000 in return for their assistance with a substantial fraud. It also reported the informant’s unreliability and withdrawal of the allegations, the officers’ denials and the absence of any prosecution for corruption.

At a case management conference, the court ordered trial by judge alone and directed a preliminary trial of meaning. The central issue was whether either edition imputed actual corruption, reasonable grounds for investigation or suspicion, or some intermediate defamatory meaning.

1. The preliminary issue was determined by finding that both editions conveyed the same defamatory meaning. They meant that there were cogent grounds to suspect that the claimant had abused his position as a police officer by colluding in a substantial fraud and receiving, with another officer, corrupt payments totalling £50,000. The book did not impute actual guilt.

2. The court had to identify the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader. That reader was neither naïve nor unduly suspicious, could read between the lines and engage in loose thinking, but was not avid for scandal. The exercise required the broad impression made by the book as a whole. An over-elaborate or excessively literal analysis was inappropriate: Skuse v Granada [1996] EMLR 278 and Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2001] EWCA Civ 1263 applied.

3. The bane and antidote had to be considered together. Although the title, the account of the criminal trial, the author’s treatment of prosecuting counsel’s accusations and the officers’ failure to testify could suggest guilt when isolated, the entire publication also identified the informant as unreliable, recorded that his allegation was uncorroborated and withdrawn, described the officers’ denials and counter-attack, and stated that neither officer had been prosecuted for corruption.

4. The meaning nevertheless exceeded the mere existence of reasonable grounds to investigate or suspect. The allegations were repeated prominently and in detail. The book was written from the perspective of attempts to uncover widespread police corruption, referred to apparently incriminating circumstances and gave readers the impression that prosecuting counsel believed the officers guilty. The word “reasonable” therefore understated the strength of the suspicion conveyed.

5. A claimant’s pleaded meaning is a high-water mark rather than the only permissible finding. The court may select a lower meaning and is not confined to the parties’ formulations or to rigid categories of guilt, suspicion and grounds for investigation. The paperback’s expanded denials and other changes did not draw the sting or alter the broad impression created by the hardback.

At a case management conference on 17 June 2005, the High Court ordered trial by judge alone and directed a preliminary trial to determine the meaning of the words complained of. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.