Riley & Anor v Heybroek

In determining meaning, the court must read the publication as a whole and adopt an impressionistic approach, while avoiding excessive textual analysis. Context and mode of publication remain relevant, but material accessed through a hyperlink may have only marginal significance where the words complained of are contained in a lengthy article.

A statement may be opinion where the publication identifies a sufficient factual substratum from which the reader can assess the author’s evaluative judgment. An inference about a person’s state of mind or motivation may also bear the badge of comment. The common-law seriousness threshold is assessed impressionistically in context, including the accusatory and vituperative character of the publication and its likely readership.

The claimants, Rachel Riley and Tracy Ann Oberman, brought a libel claim against Myrna-Jane Heybroek arising from her republication on Twitter of a hyperlink to an article by Shaun Lawson. The defendant admitted publication for the purposes of an application under CPR Part 23 and CPR PD53B, para 6.1.

The court was asked to determine the meaning of the words complained of, whether they were statements of fact or opinion, and whether they were defamatory at common law. The claimants alleged that the article accused them of subjecting a vulnerable child to bullying and abuse, encouraging further harassment, and committing criminal offences.

1. Meaning. The article conveyed that the claimants had acted outrageously by subjecting a vulnerable 16-year-old girl to repeated harassment and abuse; that their actions had encouraged others, leading to further harassment and abuse of the child and her family; and that there were grounds for the police to investigate their conduct. The pleaded allegation that the police had grounds to suspect criminal offences, or were actively investigating them, went beyond the article’s meaning.
2. Context. Meaning had to be determined by reading the article as a whole and impressionistically. The hyperlink to the article was of marginal relevance because the words complained of were contained in the article itself. The earlier linked article did not materially affect meaning or the fact/opinion issue.
3. Fact and opinion. The allegation that the claimants had subjected the child to harassment and abuse was opinion. The article set out the relevant tweets, enabling the reasonable reader to assess whether they amounted to harassment. The allegation that the claimants’ actions had encouraged others was also opinion because it involved an inference about their knowledge, apprehension and motivation, although the consequences described were factual.
4. The allegation that there were grounds for a police investigation was a statement of fact. It was not an allegation that the claimants had committed offences or that an investigation was already under way.
5. Defamatory meaning. The imputations concerning harassment, abuse and encouragement were sufficiently serious at common law. Although expressed as opinion, the article was accusatory, vituperative and prescriptive, and was likely to lower the claimants’ reputations among its readership. The police-investigation meaning added little in light of the other findings and was left for future consideration alongside sections 1 and 3 of the Defamation Act 2013.
6. The parties were invited to draw up an order reflecting those conclusions on the three preliminary issues.

First-instance determination of preliminary issues in a libel claim. No earlier decision in the same proceedings was stated.