Alsaifi v Amunwa

At an interim stage, the court must identify the meanings which words are reasonably capable of bearing, rejecting meanings that depend on strained or extravagant interpretation. The publication must be read as a whole and with the impression it would make on the ordinary reasonable reader. Reporting another person’s defamatory statement may itself be defamatory, but a fair and accurate court report may attract privilege. A report published weeks after proceedings will probably not be contemporaneous for absolute privilege, but may attract qualified privilege unless published maliciously. Commentary based on a privileged report may be protected as honest opinion where its factual basis is indicated and an honest person could have held it.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning an online article reporting and commenting on Alsaifi v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 1519 (Admin). The article described allegations of inappropriate conduct towards a 17-year-old learner and discussed the limits of the teaching regulator’s jurisdiction.

The defendant sought rulings that the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded meanings and summary disposal of the claim. The claimant sought a ruling in his favour on meaning. The central issues were the meanings reasonably capable of being conveyed, whether the report was fair and accurate, whether qualified privilege was defeated by malice, and whether any commentary was protected as honest opinion.

1. Meaning. The court rejected the claimant’s extravagant pleaded meanings, including the pleaded innuendo meanings. The alleged innuendo facts were not extrinsic facts known to readers which affected meaning. The article had to be read as a whole, without atomising individual words or engaging in over-elaborate analysis. The single meaning rule also applied.
2. The article was capable of conveying that the claimant, while working as a lecturer at a further education college, sent inappropriate emails to a 17-year-old learner, made inappropriate physical contact with her and unsuccessfully sought a relationship with her, amounting to unacceptable professional conduct. Those meanings were defamatory in the common law sense.
3. Reporting privilege. The relevant passages were a fair and accurate report of the statutory appeal judgment. Fairness and accuracy were matters of substance, not form; a report need not be verbatim and could be selective. Absolute privilege under section 14(1) of the Defamation Act 1996 was doubtful because publication several weeks after judgment was probably not contemporaneous.
4. The passages nevertheless attracted qualified privilege under section 15 of the 1996 Act and paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. The claimant had no realistic prospect of proving malice. The alleged motive to promote the defendant’s professional interests did not establish the dominant improper motive required to defeat the privilege.
5. Comment and summary disposal. The remaining passages were not capable of defaming the claimant. If they were, they constituted comment based on the reported facts and would inevitably satisfy the honest-opinion defence under section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013. The defendant’s application for summary disposal under section 8 of the 1996 Act was granted. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision in this claim is stated.