Salman Iqbal v Geo TV Limited

Statutory reporting privilege under section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996 is considered in sequence. The court must first decide whether the report falls within section 15(1) and Schedule 1, then address any applicable statutory qualification, and finally consider malice.

Section 15(3) disapplies privilege only where the reported matter is both not of public interest and published otherwise than for the public benefit. A fair and accurate report of political allegations made at a public meeting will ordinarily satisfy those requirements. The reporter is a messenger, not a gatekeeper. The publisher need not investigate truth, include denials, or edit contentious political speech. Malice requires knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference; carelessness, hostility and a hope of future evidence do not suffice.

The claimant, founder and president of ARY, sued Geo TV for libel over its live coverage and subsequent news bulletins reporting a speech by Maryam Nawaz Sharif at a Pakistani political rally. The speech alleged, among other matters, that he was a gold smuggler who had corruptly received financial advantages through his relationship with Imran Khan.

Geo sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified privilege under section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996. The High Court held that the rally was a public meeting and that the broadcasts were fair and accurate reports, but refused summary judgment because the issues under section 15(3) and malice required trial: [2024] EWHC 3024 (KB). Geo appealed. The central issues were the scope of the statutory privilege, its public-interest and public-benefit qualification, and whether a viable case of malice existed.

1. Appeal allowed. The court set aside the refusal of summary judgment and entered summary judgment for Geo on the whole claim. The claim was suitable for summary determination; the claimant had been given a fair opportunity to meet the statutory defence and formulate a case of malice.

2. Section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996 establishes a general privilege subject to stated qualifications. The correct sequence is to decide first whether section 15(1) and Schedule 1 apply, then consider any relevant matters under subsections (2) to (4), and finally malice. Section 15(3) is a disapplication of an otherwise available privilege, not an initial threshold.

3. The rally was plainly a public meeting within paragraph 12(2) of Schedule 1. It was a genuine and lawful political event, open to the public and press, held to further or discuss matters of public interest. Discussion does not require a debate: an address to an audience can suffice. A live broadcast can be a report of proceedings. Fairness and accuracy are assessed by reference to the claimant’s reputation, not by asking whether the whole event was reported.

4. The reports contained matter of public interest: allegations by a senior politician concerning corruption at the highest levels of politics and business. The seriousness, tone and contentious nature of the allegations did not alter that conclusion. Since the first condition in section 15(3) was not met, privilege could not be lost under that subsection.

5. In any event, the broadcasts were for the public benefit. The statutory scheme presumptively treats fair and accurate reports of the listed proceedings as beneficial. The status or foreign location of the meeting, the speaker’s status, the gravity of her language, and what the broadcaster knew or ought to have known about the truth were not relevant bases for withholding privilege. A broadcaster reporting a political meeting was not required to fact-check, censor, or add balancing denials. The contrary aspects of [1997] 1 All ER 655, [2008] EWHC 3054 (QB) and [2012] EWHC 2606 (QB) were rejected or confined.

6. No triable case of malice existed. Knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference may defeat a reporting privilege, but negligence, irresponsible journalism, repetition, animosity and unsupported assertions do not. The claimant identified no evidence capable of establishing that any person for whom Geo was responsible knew the allegations were false or was reckless as to their truth. He could not resist summary judgment by hoping that further evidence might emerge.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed Geo’s appeal and entered summary judgment for Geo on the entirety of the libel claim.
• High Court, King’s Bench Division, Media and Communications List: HHJ Lewis, sitting as a High Court judge, dismissed Geo’s summary judgment application despite finding that the reports met section 15(1) and Schedule 1 requirements, because section 15(3) and malice were considered triable: [2024] EWHC 3024 (KB).