Doyle v Smith

For the statutory public-interest defence, the statement complained of must itself be on a matter of public interest. A private club’s internal affairs are ordinarily private, but its decision may engage public interest where it has significant effects on the wider community.

The defendant must prove a belief, held at publication, that publishing the particular statement was in the public interest, and that belief must be reasonable. Editorial latitude does not protect deliberate falsification, a closed mind, or publication without reasonable checks where the allegation is grave.

Serious harm under Defamation Act 2013, s 1 may be inferred from the seriousness of the imputation and the context and extent of publication.

The claimant, a property developer, sued the publisher of a local online newspaper over articles concerning a proposed relocation of a rugby club and associated land development. The claim at trial concerned an article alleging his participation in an attempted fraud on club members and a later article stating that he had been arrested for blackmail and malicious communications.

The issues were the meaning of the first article, the statutory public-interest defence under Defamation Act 2013, s 4, serious harm under s 1 in respect of the second article, a late Jameel abuse-of-process argument, damages, and injunctive relief.

1. Liability. Judgment was entered for the claimant on both articles. Damages were awarded in the sums of £30,000 and £7,500 respectively, and an injunction restraining repetition was granted.

2. The natural and ordinary meaning of the first article was that there was very good reason to believe that the claimant had participated in an attempt to defraud club members of many millions of pounds. The allegation concerned the publication of knowingly false documentation and an attempt to prevent correction before the vote. It fell short of an outright allegation of guilt, but was materially more serious than a conventional Chase Level 2 imputation.

3. The article was on a matter of public interest because the proposed club relocation and associated developments would have significant effects on the wider community. The internal affairs of a private club were not, by themselves, matters of public interest. The integrity of the decision-making process became relevant because corruption of the vote could affect the proposal’s public consequences.

4. The defendant failed the reasonable-belief requirement in s 4(1)(b). He did not plead or prove a belief that it was in the public interest to publish the particular allegation that the claimant had admitted seeing the false documentation before the members’ vote. He knew that allegation was false. In any event, such a belief would not have been reasonable. The defendant had obtained the claimant’s account, failed to report it, adopted an improbable interpretation of the conversation, and made no adequate attempt to verify it.

5. The allowance for editorial judgment did not justify deliberate fakery or the presentation of a fabricated confession as fact. The standard was objective and was not reduced because the publisher was an amateur or citizen journalist.

6. The arrest allegation conveyed that there were reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant of blackmail and malicious communications. Given the seriousness of that imputation and approximately 69 recorded views, serious reputational harm was properly inferred under s 1. The inference was not displaced by the limited publication, later article, or suggested lack of credibility of the publisher.

7. The late Jameel defence was not permitted because it was raised woefully late and caused prejudice. It would also have failed on its merits: in this case there was no material distinction between the alleged abuse and the statutory serious-harm threshold.