Rashid Naseer v Adil Farooq Raja

In a libel claim, serious harm may be inferred from the gravity of the allegations, their scale of publication and the surrounding circumstances. The assessment is not merely a numbers exercise, and political hostility among publishees does not prevent the inference.

Under Defamation Act 2013, s4, the defendant must prove belief that publication of the particular statement complained of was in the public interest and that the belief was reasonable. The court considers all the circumstances, allows appropriate latitude for editorial judgment, and ordinarily treats verification, contemporary records, the meaning conveyed and an opportunity for comment as important. General evidence about public controversy does not establish a reasonable basis for specific allegations against an individual.

The claimant, a former senior Pakistan Army and ISI officer, sued the defendant, a former Army officer and journalist, over nine defamatory publications in Urdu on Twitter, YouTube and Facebook concerning alleged election manipulation, political interference, corruption and abuse of official power.

The defence of truth was withdrawn at trial. The principal issues were serious harm under s1 of the Defamation Act 2013, the public-interest defence under s4, damages and remedies under s12. The court also considered whether publication in England and Wales caused serious harm and whether the defendant had proved a reasonable belief in publishing the specific allegations.

1. Serious harm. The claimant established serious harm under s1 of the Defamation Act 2013. The allegations were grave, the publications had substantial international and UK reach, and the social-media engagement supported substantial readership and grapevine dissemination. Serious harm was not negated because some publishees might already have disliked the claimant or supported the defendant’s political position. Each publication could be assessed separately, and the evidence supported an inference of serious harm in this jurisdiction.
2. Public interest. Section 4 requires consideration of three questions: whether the statement concerned a matter of public interest; whether the defendant believed publication was in the public interest; and whether that belief was reasonable. The first question was conceded. The defence failed for the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, eighth, ninth and tenth publications. The defendant’s evidence generally addressed political conditions in Pakistan rather than the specific allegations published about the claimant. He produced no contemporary records of his sources or verification efforts, did not seek the claimant’s comment, and published serious allegations as statements of fact. His asserted intention to provide political analysis was inconsistent with the natural and ordinary meanings conveyed.
3. The seventh publication was protected by s4. Properly understood in context, it stated that the claimant and another brigadier belonged to the ISI Internal Wing and that the Wing was involved in political interference. The claimant’s membership was true, the defendant reasonably believed the wider proposition, and the publication was comparatively restrained.
4. Damages and remedies. Applying the principles governing gravity, extent of publication, reputational impact, vindication and aggravation, damages exceeding £50,000 would have been appropriate, but the claim was capped at that sum. The claimant was awarded £50,000, an injunction restraining repetition of the same or similar libels, and an order under s12 requiring publication of a judgment summary. The wording and publication arrangements were to be agreed or settled by the court.

Not stated in the judgment. The decision was a first-instance trial judgment in the High Court.