Jack Aaronson aka Dominic Ford v Marcus Stones aka Mickey Taylor

In a defamation claim, the ordinary meaning of an allegation of rape includes both non-consensual penetration and the absence of a reasonable belief in consent. A claimant may establish serious harm by inference from the gravity of the allegation, the claimant’s position, the circumstances and extent of publication, and the evidence of its impact.

The statutory truth defence requires clear evidence, assessed on the balance of probabilities. A public-interest defence must be considered separately for each publication. Discussion of sexual abuse in an industry may concern the public interest, but a targeted public accusation that a named individual committed rape does not necessarily do so. A publisher claiming a journalistic role is held to objective standards of responsible publication.

The claimant, a US-based entrepreneur in the adult entertainment industry, sued the defendant over eleven publications on Twitter and YouTube accusing him of rape, serial rape and related misconduct. The defendant relied on the statutory defences of truth under section 2 and publication on a matter of public interest under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013.

The central factual dispute concerned two alleged incidents involving a performer in Miami. The court also had to determine the meaning of the publications, including whether one tweet conveyed reasonable grounds to suspect rape, whether serious harm was established, and whether either statutory defence succeeded.

1. Meaning. The meanings pleaded for the publications were defamatory. The tweet referring to the claimant’s lawyer was to be read in context and conveyed a Chase level 2 meaning: reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant of rape. Applying the ordinary meaning of the word, informed by the reasoning in DPP v Morgan, an allegation of rape conveyed both non-consensual penetration and the absence of a reasonable belief in consent. The modern statutory requirement of reasonable belief was material to the ordinary meaning.
2. Serious harm. Each publication caused or was likely to cause serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. The finding rested on the extreme gravity of allegations of serial rape, the claimant’s position in the relevant industry, the extensive Twitter and YouTube publication, evidence of reactions by readers, and business loss.
3. Truth. The defendant bore the burden of proving substantial truth by clear evidence on the balance of probabilities. The allegations of multiple rape failed because there was no evidence of multiple victims; one retracted allegation and an unnamed alleged third victim could not establish that imputation. The evidence did not establish either non-consent or the absence of a reasonable belief in consent in relation to either Miami incident. The truth defence therefore failed in full.
4. Public interest. Section 4 required three questions to be answered separately for each publication: whether it was on a matter of public interest, whether the defendant believed publication was in the public interest, and whether that belief was reasonable. General discussion of rape and abuse in the adult entertainment industry could be a matter of public interest, but these publications were principally targeted accusations against the claimant, accompanied in some instances by personal abuse. The first requirement therefore failed.
5. In any event, the defendant had not shown a specific belief in the public interest for several publications. His belief was also objectively unreasonable. He made no adequate attempt to verify allegations of grave criminality, failed to give the claimant a meaningful opportunity to respond, acted with mixed motives, and published in an abusive and sensational tone. A person adopting a journalistic or reporting role is held to the standards reasonably expected of a professional journalist and receives no allowance for lack of training or expertise.
6. Disposition. Judgment was entered for the claimant. The court awarded £110,000, including aggravated damages, and granted an injunction. Leave was given to amend the Claim Form to reflect the damages award.