Turley v UNITE the Union & Anor

[2019] EWHC 3547 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2019] EWHC 3547 (QB) · [2019] EWHC 3547(QB)
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
19 December 2019
Judgment text

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Subjects
Tort Defamation Media law
Keywords
libel publication by contributor serious harm Chase level 2 meaning truth defence public interest defence section 4 Defamation Act 2013 aggravated damages trade union membership online publication
Outcome
judgment for the claimant (£75,000 damages)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A contributor to a defamatory publication is liable where it knowingly authorises publication of its own defamatory statement in the relevant context. It is not liable merely for supplying non-defamatory background facts to a journalist who adds the defamatory sting.

For a Chase level 2 allegation, a truth defence requires objectively reasonable grounds, existing at publication, to suspect the claimant of the alleged wrongdoing. Negligence or a failure to make enquiries will rarely justify suspicion of dishonesty.

A public-interest defence requires each defendant to prove both an actual belief that publication was in the public interest and the objective reasonableness of that belief. Basic factual verification and a fair opportunity for the subject to respond are central requirements.

Factual background

The claimant, then a Labour MP, sued the defendants over an article published on the Second Defendant’s political blog. The article alleged reasonable grounds to suspect that she had dishonestly joined the First Defendant’s discounted Unite Community membership category by falsely declaring herself unwaged.

The Second Defendant admitted publication. The issues included whether the First Defendant was also liable through information supplied to the blog and its press statement; serious harm; the statutory defences of truth and publication on a matter of public interest; alleged abuse of process; and remedies. The non-libel claims for misuse of private information, breach of confidence and breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 were settled during trial.

Held

  1. Judgment for the claimant. Both defendants were liable for the publication of the article. The claim against the First Defendant failed insofar as it was based on alleged supply of basic source information: those facts were not defamatory and did not cause the article’s defamatory sting. The claimant had also not proved that a person for whose acts the First Defendant was liable supplied them.

  2. The First Defendant was, however, liable for its press statement. Its press officer gave it on the record for publication, knowing the broad content and context of the intended article and that it would identify the claimant. The statement itself conveyed, at least, that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant had joined on a fraudulent basis. The First Defendant was liable only for the single meaning of the article as a whole, namely a Chase level 2 allegation of suspected dishonest submission of a false application.

  3. The claimant proved serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. The allegation concerned the honesty and integrity of an MP. Its online circulation and adverse reactions provided evidence of actual reputational harm, reinforced by a foreseeable grapevine effect.

  4. The truth defence failed. The relevant objective facts gave no reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant knew Unite Community membership was restricted to unwaged persons or that she acted dishonestly. The online process did not require an employment-status declaration and did not alert applicants clearly to the restriction. The claimant’s prompt acceptance of transfer when told of her ineligibility was consistent with an innocent mistake. A case that she should have made further enquiries alleged, at most, negligence.

  5. The article concerned a matter of public interest, but neither defendant established the section 4 defence. The First Defendant did not prove that its press officer actually believed publication was in the public interest. The Second Defendant held that belief, but it was unreasonable: he failed to verify the asserted false declaration and did not fairly put the allegations, including the allegation of fraud, to the claimant before imposing an unjustifiably short deadline for publication.

  6. The claimant had not acted dishonestly in the litigation and had not abused the court’s process. Her earlier lack of candour about WhatsApp messages was a serious misjudgment and modestly reduced damages, but it did not establish dishonesty.

  7. Damages of £75,000 were awarded, including aggravation. The continuing publication, absence of correction or apology, and unfounded attacks on the claimant’s honesty and fitness to be an MP made vindication especially important. The court invited submissions on an injunction and expressed a preliminary view that an order under section 12 requiring the Second Defendant to publish a judgment summary was appropriate.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

not stated in the judgment.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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