Franklin William Rzucek v Alan Vinnicombe

A breach of a court order is not necessarily serious or significant for the purposes of relief from sanction. The court should assess its practical effect, particularly any impact on hearing dates, the conduct of the litigation and prejudice to the other party. Where a defence has been struck out and judgment entered, remedy is generally determined on the basis of the claimant’s pleaded case, subject to correction of an extravagant, impossible or plainly incorrect case. The tort of harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 requires both conduct within England and Wales and its experience as harassment by the victim within the jurisdiction. An overseas claimant may nevertheless seek an injunction against an apprehended future breach on entering the jurisdiction. Defamation is complete on publication irrespective of the claimant’s location, but damages concern the impact within the jurisdiction.

The claimant’s sister and nieces were murdered in the United States. The defendant, a UK-based YouTube publisher, subsequently posted numerous videos about the murders, the claimant’s family and the claimant’s legal fundraising. The claimant brought proceedings for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and defamation.

The defendant’s defence and counterclaim were struck out under CPR 3.4(2), and judgment was entered for the claimant. The claimant later served his remedy witness statement late and sought relief from sanction. The issues were whether relief should be granted, whether the harassment claim should be stayed or could attract a remedy despite the claimant’s residence in the United States, and the appropriate defamation damages and injunction.

1. Relief from sanction. Applying the three-stage approach in [2014] EWCA Civ 906, the late service of the claimant’s witness statement was not serious or significant. Although breach of a court order is serious in one sense, the relevant question was whether this breach disrupted the litigation, imperilled the hearing date or prejudiced the defendant. It did none of those things. The court therefore granted relief, notwithstanding that the explanation was only an oversight, and permitted both parties to rely on their late evidence.
2. Effect of the struck-out defence. Following Brett Wilson v Persons Unknown, the court proceeded on the basis of the claimant’s pleaded case. A detailed retrial of liability would improperly resurrect the struck-out defence. Modification was required only if the pleaded meaning was wildly extravagant or impossible, the words were clearly not defamatory, or another significant aspect of the pleaded case was plainly and conspicuously incorrect. Those exceptions did not arise.
3. Harassment jurisdiction. The court followed Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Ltd and Lawal v Adeyinka. The territorial limitation in sections 1(1) and 14(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 meant that past harassment required both acts committed within the jurisdiction and harassment experienced there by the victim. The claimant was outside the jurisdiction throughout the relevant period, so no remedy was available for past harassment. The court declined to stay the claim, since an indefinite stay would be undesirable and would risk future double recovery.
4. A person outside the jurisdiction may, in an appropriate case, seek an injunction against an apprehended breach under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 if they intend to enter England and Wales and there is a proper basis for apprehending future harassment. The court expressed no concluded view on whether such relief would be granted in the future.
5. Defamation and remedies. Defamation was complete when the publications were made, regardless of the claimant’s location. Damages were assessed by reference to the gravity and extent of publication, vindication, distress, the claimant’s existing reputation and connections in the jurisdiction, and aggravating conduct. The court awarded £40,000 in general and aggravated damages. The defendant’s failure to apologise or retract, and repetition of the allegations during the litigation, aggravated the damages; his restrained conduct at the hearing and the absence of deliberate delay did not. A narrowly drawn injunction restraining repetition of the defamatory allegations was proportionate.
6. Under CPR 16.3(7), the amount stated in the claim form did not limit the judgment, although deliberate undervaluation to avoid court fees could constitute an abuse of process. No such abuse was established here.

The defendant applied for permission to appeal against the order striking out his defence and counterclaim. Permission was refused by Warby LJ on 10 March 2026. The present court proceeded to determine remedies and the claimant’s relief-from-sanction application.