Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown, Responsible for the Operation and Publication of the Website www.solicitorsfromhelluk.com

Persons unknown may be sued where their description identifies with certainty who is included and excluded. Final injunctive relief may be granted against them, and alternative service may be authorised where it is reasonably likely to notify those responsible.

On an undefended defamation claim, default judgment may normally be based on unchallenged, verified particulars. A profit-making body can establish serious financial loss under the Defamation Act 2013 through facts showing that online allegations were likely to deter customers and cause substantial lost business. Where anonymous defendants do not engage with proceedings, final prohibitory and mandatory injunctions may be necessary and proportionate to protect reputation.

The claimant solicitors’ firm sued persons unknown responsible for operating and publishing a website. The site listed the firm as “Solicitors from Hell” and published an anonymous complaint accusing it of serious professional misconduct, overcharging and harassment.

The claimant could not identify the operators. It obtained permission for alternative service by email, served the claim and later application, and received no response, acknowledgment of service or defence. It sought default judgment, final injunctions and summary relief under the Defamation Act 1996.

The central issues were whether the court had jurisdiction over the unknown defendants, whether the pleaded case established serious financial loss, and whether final prohibitory and mandatory relief and the statutory maximum summary damages should be granted in their absence.

1. Application granted. The claimant was entitled to default judgment, final injunctions and summary disposal awarding £10,000 damages.

2. The description of the defendants identified with certainty those responsible for operation and publication of the specified website. Alternative service had been duly effected and the claimant had taken all reasonable steps to notify the defendants. Their choice to remain anonymous and not participate was no reason to adjourn. Relief affecting expression could therefore be considered consistently with section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

3. The defendants were properly treated as editors under section 1(2) of the Defamation Act 1996. On the pleaded case they operated a site producing its own content and permitting third-party material. They were not merely within an excluded intermediary category. The jurisdictional requirement in section 10(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 was therefore satisfied.

4. The court could proceed on the unchallenged, verified particulars on the default-judgment application. The pleaded defamatory meanings were not extravagant. The particulars established serious financial loss: the firm depended materially on internet-generated instructions; the words appeared prominently in searches; they were likely to deter prospective clients; and there was evidence of an actual lost instruction and other financial impact.

5. Final relief was necessary and proportionate to protect the claimant’s reputation from continuing false allegations. The court granted both prohibitory injunctions and mandatory orders requiring removal of specified webpages and related metadata or search links. Under sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996, there was no realistic defence or other reason for trial. The maximum £10,000 summary award was justified by the seriousness, persistence, likely circulation and vindicatory purpose of damages.

not stated in the judgment.