Kevin Joseph Conroy v Adrian Andrzej Stojek

In a defamation damages assessment following default judgment, the court ordinarily proceeds on the pleaded case, but must reject meanings or serious-harm allegations that are wholly extravagant or unreal. Serious harm may be inferred from surrounding circumstances; direct evidence of lost clients or identifiable readers is unnecessary. Online accessibility creates no presumption of readership, but platform, duration, prominence, credibility and engagement may support an inference of publication. Once serious harm is established, damages cannot be nominal. The award must remain compensatory and proportionate, with limited publication evidence moderating the sum. A defendant’s motive is relevant to aggravated damages only where properly pleaded and proved. An injunction requires a real or credible threat of republication.

The claimant, a solicitor, brought a defamation claim against a former client concerning a Google review alleging professional dishonesty and fraud. Default judgment was entered, and the court later refused the defendant’s application to set it aside. The claimant sought £30,000 in damages and an injunction, but relied on inferential evidence rather than identifying any reader who had thought less of him or any measurable business loss. The issues were whether the pleaded meaning and serious-harm case were sufficiently realistic for assessment, how reputational harm and the extent of publication should be evaluated, and whether a continuing threat justified injunctive relief.

Outcome. The court assessed damages at £9,500 and refused an injunction.

1. Default judgment. The court ordinarily proceeds on the claimant’s unchallenged pleaded case. It must nevertheless consider the merits of the pleaded meaning and serious-harm case sufficiently to prevent wholly extravagant, unreal or non-defamatory claims being accepted. This approach was drawn from Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2016] 4 WLR 69, Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB) and Charakida v Jackson [2019] EWHC 858 (QB). The analogous offer-of-amends regime under the Defamation Act 1996 also permits consideration of mitigation and aggravation, as explained in Undre v L.B. Harrow [2016] EWHC 2761 (QB).
2. Damages. Libel damages are compensatory. They vindicate reputation and compensate reputational harm and, where claimed, distress. Except in very rare cases involving exemplary damages, the defendant’s motive is not relevant unless a properly pleaded aggravated-damages case makes malicious or hurtful intent relevant to injury to feelings. The court applied the evaluative factors identified in Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB), subject to the proportionality limit identified in Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) Ltd [1994] QB 670.
3. Serious harm and publication. Serious harm may be inferred without evidence identifying readers, lost clients or measurable consequences. It is not a numbers game. Online accessibility creates no presumption that words were read, but the nature and circumstances of publication may justify an inference of readership. The review’s seriousness, the defendant’s identity as a former client, its ten-month availability on Google, its prominence among only five reviews, and two positive engagements made the pleaded case sufficiently realistic and substantial. The principles in Monir v Wood and Amoudi v Brisard [2006] EWHC 1062 (QB); [2007] 1 WLR 113 were applied.
4. Quantum and injunction. Once serious harm was established, damages could not be merely nominal. A low five-figure sum was the starting point, moderated because the claimant could not prove the scale or impact of publication. The claimant bore the burden of proving extent of publication, and the court assumed no greater publication than the minimum consistent with serious harm. The public judgment provided vindication. There was no real or credible threat of republication, so an injunction was unnecessary and refused.

This was a first-instance assessment. The judgment records that default judgment was entered on 2 October 2025, the defendant’s application to set it aside was refused on 18 February 2026, and the claim was transferred to the Royal Courts of Justice for assessment of damages.