Charakida v Jackson

In an undefended libel claim, default judgment may be entered without a hearing where the procedural requirements are met and the court can fairly determine the relief sought. The court must nevertheless consider whether the pleaded meanings are reasonably capable of being defamatory and whether the serious harm requirement is satisfied. Serious harm may be inferred from the gravity and context of the imputations and evidence of adverse action by readers.

Summary disposal requires an adjudication on the merits. The court must be satisfied that no defence has a realistic prospect of success and that there is no other reason for a trial. General damages may be assessed on adequate evidence, but special damages require proof of the fact, extent and causal connection of the alleged financial loss.

The claimant, a consultant dermatologist, brought an action for libel against a former patient concerning words published in an online blog about a liposuction procedure. The defendant did not acknowledge service, was not represented and did not participate.

The claimant applied for judgment in default, summary relief under sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996, damages and an injunction. The court considered whether the applications could fairly be determined on paper, whether the pleaded meanings were defamatory, whether serious harm was established, and whether the evidence supported general and special damages.

1. Paper disposal. The court proceeded without a hearing under CPR 23.8(c). Default judgment was suitable for paper disposal, but summary disposal required evidence and evaluation of the merits. A skeleton argument should ordinarily accompany an application of this kind, particularly where the matter is to be decided on paper.
2. Default judgment and meaning. The court was not bound to accept wholly extravagant or unreal defamatory meanings. The full publication should ordinarily be supplied directly to the court because meaning depends on context. The pleaded meanings were not all defamatory, but meanings alleging incompetent and unprofessional treatment, needless roughness, failure to use anaesthetic and a poor result were reasonably capable of bearing defamatory imputations.
3. Serious harm. Applying the requirement in section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, serious harm could be inferred from the gravity of the imputations, their alleged internet publication and the pleaded evidence that at least three readers cancelled booked procedures. It was unnecessary to decide whether section 1(2) would also be satisfied. Judgment for damages to be assessed was therefore justified.
4. Injunction. The defendant’s failure to remove the publication or respond to the letter of claim justified a permanent prohibitory injunction. The injunction was limited so as not to restrain access to the courts or complaints to a health regulator concerning matters within the regulator’s competence, at least absent malice. A mandatory injunction requiring removal was refused at that stage because the relief was more onerous and the evidence and submissions did not establish that it was appropriate.
5. Summary relief and damages. Under sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996, the court had to be satisfied that there was no defence with a realistic prospect of success and no other reason for trial. The claim for special damages was inadequately pleaded and unsupported by evidence of the patients, bookings, charges, costs, profits, mitigation or causation. Special damages were refused. General damages of £6,000 were awarded on the evidence of serious imputations made against a consultant dermatologist, online publication to several people and resulting cancellations. Interest was not recoverable on general damages for defamation.
6. The claimant was awarded the costs of the claim and applications, subject to detailed assessment.