Chandler v O'Connor

After default judgment in a defamation claim, the claimant may seek summary relief instead of conventional damages assessment. The court must assess whether the remaining issues require a trial, rather than reconsidering liability or the merits of a defence already disposed of by default judgment. Relevant considerations include the absence of other defendants, conflicts of evidence, the seriousness and extent of publication, proportionality and the overriding objective. Damages under the summary-relief procedure are capped at £10,000. Where a defendant will not agree to a correction and apology, the court may order publication of a summary of its judgment under the statutory mechanism. In Twitter litigation, publication analytics should be preserved and obtained before tweets are deleted.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning three tweets alleging that he had engaged in money laundering and had acted for a foreign state in promoting a hard Brexit. Judgment in default was entered after the defendant failed to acknowledge service. The claimant then elected to seek summary relief under sections 8 to 10 of the Defamation Act 1996, including damages and publication of a correction, apology or judgment summary.

The defendant did not participate in the proceedings or attend the hearing. The issues were whether the remaining claim should be dealt with summarily, the appropriate damages, and whether an order for publication should be made.

1. The claimant’s application for summary relief was granted. The defendant was ordered to pay £10,000 in damages and to publish a suitable correction and apology if agreed, or otherwise a summary of the judgment.

2. Following judgment in default, the threshold in section 8(3) of the Defamation Act 1996 applies to the relief sought. The question is whether there is any reason why the claim for damages and other relief should be tried. Section 8(3) does not require reconsideration of the merits of a defence to liability already determined by default judgment. This followed the approach in Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd [2002] QB 783 and was confirmed by Charakida v Jackson [2019] EWHC 858 (QB).

3. Applying section 8(4), there was one defendant, no conflict of evidence, no participation by the defendant and no suggestion that a full trial was required. Given the claimant’s election to seek capped damages, a full trial would be disproportionate and inconsistent with the overriding objective. The summary-disposal procedure was therefore appropriate, as contemplated in Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2016] 4 WLR 69.

4. The allegations were serious and aggravating conduct increased the need for vindication. However, publication was limited and there was no reliable evidence of particular reputational harm. The court assessed damages at £10,000, the statutory maximum.

5. The court noted that Twitter analytics data concerning the extent of publication should be preserved and obtained before tweets are deleted, adopting the practical guidance in Monroe v Hopkins [2017] 4 WLR 68.

6. Under section 9 of the Defamation Act 1996, the parties were expected to agree the correction and apology. If they could not, the court could require publication of a summary of its judgment. Such an order pursued the legitimate aim of protecting reputation and was, subject to its terms and manner of publication, necessary and proportionate, by analogy with section 12 of the Defamation Act 2013 and the discussion in Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB).