Dr Matthew Garrett v Dr Roy Schestowitz & Anor

In a defamation claim, serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 requires proof of actual or probable reputational harm, not merely defamatory tendency. In a mass-publication case, serious harm may be inferred from the meaning and gravity of the words, the claimant’s situation, the circumstances and extent of publication, the likely readership, and inherent probabilities.

Truth, honest opinion and public-interest defences must be established by evidence. A defendant cannot rely on suspicion as proof of truth, or establish honest opinion without a factual basis. The public-interest defence requires a three-stage inquiry into public interest, the defendant’s actual belief, and the reasonableness of that belief.

The claimant sued over 24 publications on websites operated by the defendants, alleging that he had conducted an anonymous campaign of online abuse, harassment and criminality. He also brought a data-protection claim. The defendants denied liability, relied on the statutory defences of truth, honest opinion and publication on a matter of public interest, and counterclaimed in harassment.

The defendants provided no evidence in support of their defences and did not call witnesses. The central issues were the natural and ordinary meaning of the publications, whether they caused serious harm to the claimant’s reputation in England and Wales, whether any statutory defence was established, and whether the harassment counterclaim could succeed.

1. Meaning and preliminary issues. The natural and ordinary meaning of each publication was to be determined objectively, by reference to the hypothetical reasonable reader reading the publication as a whole and in context. The publisher’s intention was irrelevant. The court applied the guidance in Stocker v Stocker, Koutsogiannis v Random House Group and Riley v Murray. The distinction between fact and opinion was also objective. Criminal and illegal allegations conveyed factual imputations, whereas certain allegations of racism, misogyny and similar attitudes conveyed evaluative opinions.
2. Serious harm. The publications had a grave defamatory tendency. The claimant established that his professional, academic, employment and personal reputation was materially engaged in England and Wales. Their continuing online availability, cross-referencing, search-engine accessibility, the websites’ reputation, the likely readership and the gravity of the imputations established a mass-publication factual matrix. Serious reputational harm was therefore inferred under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, applying Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd and the guidance in Slipper v BBC, Cairns v Modi and Blake v Fox. The evidential gap concerning publication could also be resolved against the defendants under the principle in Armory v Delamirie, as recognised in Dudley v Phillips.
3. Defences. The truth defence failed because the defendants’ pleaded matters were incapable of proving that the claimant operated the sockpuppet accounts or committed the alleged conduct. The honest-opinion defence failed because the opinions lacked a factual basis within section 3(4)(a). The public-interest defence failed at the second stage because there was no evidence that the defendants believed publication was in the public interest, and in any event the belief would not have been reasonable. The court applied the three-stage approach described in Turley v Unite The Union.
4. Other claims and remedies. The data-protection claim was not considered because further analysis would be disproportionate after the defamation claim succeeded. The harassment counterclaim failed because the defendants could not prove the claimant’s responsibility for the alleged course of conduct. Judgment was entered for the claimant in defamation. Damages were assessed at £70,000. Injunctive relief and an order under section 12 of the Defamation Act 2013 were indicated as necessary and proportionate remedies.