BRIAN DUDLEY v MICHAEL PHILLIPS

In a default judgment claim involving defamation and inaccurate personal data, damages are assessed by reference to the pleaded meanings unless those meanings are wildly extravagant, impossible or plainly non-defamatory. Defamation principles concerning distress, reputational harm and vindication also guide compensation for inaccurate personal data under the Data Protection Act 1998 and reputational harm under GDPR Article 82. The court may infer substantial publication where the defendant has failed to provide disclosure, particularly where online material was accessible through ordinary searches and produced a grapevine effect. Continuing publication, repetition of allegations and the defendant’s litigation conduct may justify an injunction. Section 13 of the Defamation Act 2013 may be used to require a website operator to remove defamatory material, even where the operator was not present at the hearing.

The claimant brought claims for libel and for compensation under the Data Protection Act 1998 and GDPR concerning online publications accusing him of financial wrongdoing, fraud and sexual misconduct. A default judgment had been entered after the defendant failed to acknowledge service and defend the claim. The defendant was later debarred from defending and failed to establish a real prospect of successfully defending the claim for the purposes of setting aside the default judgment.

The trial therefore concerned financial remedies, an injunction and an order under section 13 of the Defamation Act 2013. The claimant limited the total value of his claims to £10,000.

1. Default judgment and meanings. The court refused to set aside the default judgment. Under CPR r 12.12(1), the particulars of claim identify the nature and scope of liability. In assessing damages following default judgment, the pleaded meanings are adopted unless they are wildly extravagant or impossible, or the words are clearly not defamatory in tendency. The same approach applies when assessing the meanings relied upon in an inaccurate-data claim.
2. Damages and compensation. Libel damages compensate distress and hurt feelings, actual or inferred reputational injury, and provide vindication. Compensation under section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998 is not confined to material loss and may include distress and reputational harm. The court saw no principled reason to adopt a different approach to reputational harm under Article 82 of the GDPR.
3. Publication and quantum. The court inferred publication in the low hundreds from known publication, online accessibility, professional searches and hyperlink sharing. The allegations were grave and had caused serious reputational harm, including loss of a job offer. Without the claimant’s £10,000 cap, damages would have been assessed at approximately £30,000 to £40,000. Judgment was entered for £10,000 for the combined libel and data protection claims.
4. Injunction. The continuing availability of the reviews, repetition of the allegations and the defendant’s conduct justified an injunction restraining further publication of the libels and further processing of the claimant’s personal data.
5. Section 13 order. An order was made under section 13 of the Defamation Act 2013 requiring the website operator to remove the reviews. The operator was given liberty to apply to vary or discharge the order.