Charles Northcott v David Hundeyin

In a libel remedies hearing following default judgment, damages must compensate injury to reputation, vindicate the claimant’s good name, and reflect distress, hurt and humiliation. The assessment is fact-sensitive. Gravity, extent of publication, the claimant’s professional role, the publisher’s authority, reputational percolation and post-publication conduct are relevant.

Aggravating conduct may be reflected in one global compensatory award. A summary-judgment order under Defamation Act 2013, section 12 requires a realistic prospect of repairing reputation or achieving vindication and must be necessary and proportionate. An order under section 13 may require website operators to remove defamatory material where the defendant has failed to comply, or is unlikely to comply with, a personal injunction.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning serious allegations published online by the defendant. The defendant failed to acknowledge service or file a defence, and Master Stevens entered judgment in default under CPR Part 12. Collins Rice J later granted an injunction restraining republication and requiring removal of the article.

The remedies trial concerned the claimant’s damages, whether the hearing should proceed in the defendant’s absence, and whether orders should be made under sections 12 and 13 of the Defamation Act 2013. The defendant did not attend or participate.

1. The court proceeded in the defendant’s absence under CPR r 39.3. The defendant had notice of the proceedings and hearing, had previously engaged in correspondence, and had deliberately chosen not to defend or attend. The procedural safeguards permitting an absent party to seek relief from a judgment remained available.
2. Following default judgment, damages were assessed by reference to the pleaded claim, which operated as a proxy for the terms of the judgment. The assessment remained fact-sensitive. The award had to compensate reputational damage, vindicate the claimant’s good name, and compensate distress, hurt and humiliation.
3. The relevant considerations included the gravity of the libel, its reach, the claimant’s professional standing, the defendant’s authority and credibility, the likely percolation of the allegations, and the defendant’s refusal to retract or apologise. The defendant’s post-publication campaign of repetition, trolling and persecution aggravated the injury to feelings. Consistently with Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the court made one global compensatory award rather than identifying a separate punitive sum for aggravation.
4. The court awarded £95,000. The allegations directly attacked the claimant’s professional integrity, had a substantial online reach, seriously affected his career and personal life, and were accompanied by exceptionally aggravating conduct.
5. Under section 12 of the Defamation Act 2013, the court ordered publication of a summary of the judgment. The purpose was reputational repair and vindication, not punishment. The order was justified because publication through the same online platforms could realistically reach original publishees and future readers, and was a proportionate interference with Article 10 rights.
6. Under section 13, the court ordered the relevant website operators to remove the defamatory part of the article. The defendant had failed to comply with the personal injunction, making an order against operators necessary. The operators were permitted to apply to discharge or vary the order.

This was a first-instance remedies hearing following default judgment entered by Master Stevens on 24 June 2024. Collins Rice J had previously granted a final injunction on 29 July 2024. The present court assessed damages and made further remedial orders.