Xiuling Wei & Ors v Jingping Long & Ors

Following default judgment, the court must generally assess remedies on the basis that the pleaded liability case is established. It may depart from that approach where the claim is legally impossible or fails a necessary legal threshold. Default judgment does not prevent scrutiny of causation, the type of loss, or the legal availability of a remedy.

Harassment under the Protection From Harassment Act 1997 is territorially limited to England and Wales, but conduct sent from abroad may fall within the Act where its impact is suffered in England and Wales. Defamation damages compensate reputational injury and vindication, whereas harassment damages do not include compensation for reputational injury. Separate awards may be made where the claims overlap but are not co-extensive. A permanent injunction and an order to publish a judgment summary may be justified where necessary and proportionate to protect reputation and prevent renewed harassment.

The claimants brought proceedings against four defendants for harassment, libel, malicious falsehood and privacy-related claims arising from conduct in Ukraine, the United States and England, including extensive online publications. A previous judgment determined the issues concerning the fourth defendant. The first defendant failed to engage with the proceedings.

Default judgment had been entered against the first defendant, with damages to be assessed. The court determined the remaining issues concerning the first defendant, including whether the pleaded claims crossed the relevant legal thresholds, the assessment of damages and personal injury loss, aggravated damages, injunctive relief, publication of a judgment summary and costs.

1. Default judgment and legal thresholds. A default judgment under CPR Part 12 was conclusive on liability, but the court was required to assess the remedies actually available. Applying the approach in Suttle v Walker, remedies could be refused where a claim was legally impossible or failed a necessary legal threshold. C4’s claims failed because the relevant harassment occurred outside England and Wales, its impact was not suffered within the jurisdiction, and the pleaded defamation case did not establish serious harm. Claims by C1, C2 and C3 alleging direct breaches of Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR were legally impossible because the Human Rights Act 1998 permits such proceedings only against public authorities.
2. Harassment. The first defendant’s visit to the claimants’ home in England and his online publications were within the territorial scope of the Protection From Harassment Act 1997. The claims adequately pleaded a course of conduct amounting to harassment. Damages were assessed by reference to anxiety, distress and injury to feelings, including the relevant Vento bands. Awards of £45,000 were made to C1 and C2 and £32,000 to C3, each including a modest allowance for aggravating features.
3. Libel and overlapping causes of action. The pleaded imputations that C1, C2 and C3 were involved in corruption and money laundering were defamatory and capable of satisfying the serious-harm threshold on an inferential basis. Separate libel awards were appropriate because the harassment claims covered conduct beyond the defamatory publications and libel damages additionally addressed reputational injury and vindication. C1 received £10,000; C2 and C3 received nominal awards of £500 each.
4. Personal injury and special damages. The court accepted expert evidence that the harassment was a substantial causal contributor to C2’s heart attack, despite pre-existing risk factors. Foreseeability was not an essential element of the harassment cause of action. C2 received £6,500 for personal injury, interest and £9,849.21 in special damages.
5. Other remedies and costs. A final injunction restraining further harassment and defamation was justified despite Article 10 because the publications were not genuinely journalistic, literary or artistic, and damages alone were insufficient protection. The first defendant was ordered to publish a summary of the judgment on fishandchips.fans and 6park.com using the pleaded usernames. He was also ordered to pay indemnity costs, summarily assessed, and a payment reflecting pro bono costs.

This was a first-instance judgment. The court noted that issues concerning the fourth defendant had previously been determined in [2025] EWHC 158 (KB).