Suttle v Walker

After default judgment, remedies are ordinarily assessed on the claimant’s unchallenged pleaded case. Evidence and factual findings are unnecessary unless the claim is impossible or fails a required legal threshold. Damages remain compensatory, not punitive. Where libel and harassment damages overlap in distress and injury to feelings, a single award avoids double counting. Libel damages must reflect reputational harm, vindication and distress, taking account of seriousness, reach, publishees and online percolation. A targeted and sustained social-media campaign may justify the upper Vento band. An injunction is justified by a real risk of repetition. An order under section 12 of the Defamation Act 2013 may be refused where the defendant cannot effectively reach the original audience.

The Claimant, a care-home manager, sued the Defendant over nine Facebook postings and related videos alleging animal cruelty. The claims were for libel, harassment and breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998. The Defendant neither acknowledged service nor served a defence, and judgment in default was entered by Warby J on 31 October 2018. She did not apply to set it aside, provide supported evidence explaining her absence, or attend the remedies hearing. The central issues were whether the hearing should proceed in her absence, the proper approach to remedies following default judgment, the assessment of damages, and whether an injunction or publication order should be made.

1. Disposition. Judgment was given for the Claimant. The court awarded £40,000 general damages and £10,405 special damages, granted an injunction, and refused an order requiring publication of a summary of the judgment.
2. The court was justified in proceeding in the Defendant’s absence. She was aware of the proceedings, had not engaged with them, made no application for an adjournment or to set aside the default judgment, and provided no supporting evidence for the assertions in an anonymous letter. The approach in Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EMLR 27 and Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2015] 4 WLR 69 was applied. The court also applied the approach in Pirtek (UK) Limited v Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB) and attached no weight to the unsupported anonymous denial of responsibility.
3. Under rule 12.11(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the ordinary course after default judgment is to determine remedies on the claimant’s unchallenged pleaded case. The court need not conduct a fact-finding exercise. Departure is justified only where the claim is impossible or a required legal threshold has not been met. The pleaded libel and harassment claims disclosed no such defect. The data-protection claims were not separately considered because they added nothing and no additional remedy was sought.
4. Damages were compensatory, not punitive. Since libel and harassment damages overlapped in respect of hurt, upset and distress, a single award was appropriate and avoided double counting. Applying the principles discussed in Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB) and John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586, the court considered the gravity and substantial reach of the allegations, their local percolation, the threats and abusive responses, the damage to reputation and the lasting distress. General damages were assessed at £40,000, with no material additional uplift for vindication.
5. The Vento bands provided the framework for harassment damages. The campaign was targeted, relentless, designed to recruit others, conducted under anonymity, and caused fear and lasting adverse effects. It therefore fell within the upper band. The injunction was justified by a real risk of further libel or harassment, demonstrated particularly by the Defendant’s re-uploading of material after its removal.
6. Although the court had a discretion under section 12 of the Defamation Act 2013 to order publication of a judgment summary, it refused the order. The Defendant no longer had an effective means of communicating with the original audience, while the Claimant could publicise the judgment more effectively. Such an order was not punitive.

This was a first-instance remedies hearing. The judgment records that Warby J entered judgment in default on 31 October 2018 under Part 12 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. The Defendant did not apply to set it aside and did not attend the remedies hearing.