Pirtek (UK) Limited v Robert Jackson

Where a defamation defendant, having received proper notice, neither acknowledges service nor advances a defence or evidence, the court may enter default judgment on the unchallenged pleaded case. For a profit-making claimant, Defamation Act 2013 section 1(2) is met where serious financial loss is likely in the sense of a tendency, or where serious actual loss is pleaded.

After default judgment, summary disposal under the Defamation Act 1996 does not require the claimant to disprove defences which the defendant chose not to plead. The court may award the statutory maximum where the gravity and financial consequences justify it. Injunctive relief must remain no wider than necessary to protect reputation and business from likely repetition.

Pirtek, a company supplying hydraulic hose replacement services through franchisees, sued Mr Jackson for libel and malicious falsehood. It alleged that he created or controlled a website, Twitter account, Facebook page and email account used to publish 55 statements accusing Pirtek of unsafe aviation practices, abusive and fraudulent treatment of franchisees, and tax avoidance.

Mr Jackson did not acknowledge service, file a defence, adduce evidence, or attend the hearing. Proceedings and the applications were served by methods authorised by a Master. Pirtek sought default judgment, summary relief, damages, an injunction, a declaration of falsity, removal orders and costs.

The central issues were whether the court could proceed in his absence, whether he was an author or editor for the purposes of section 10 of the Defamation Act 2013, whether the pleaded claims were viable, and what final and summary relief was justified.

1. Judgment was entered for Pirtek. Mr Jackson had proper notice of both the claim and the hearing. There was no evidence that an adjournment would be fair or necessary. The requirements of Human Rights Act 1998 section 12(2) were met because reasonable steps had been taken to notify him.

2. The conditions for default judgment were satisfied. Under CPR 12.11(1), the court could proceed on Pirtek’s unchallenged particulars. The pleaded case, and independently the uncontradicted evidence, established that Mr Jackson was the author or at least the editor of the publications. The jurisdictional bar in Defamation Act 2013 section 10(1) therefore did not apply. Assertions made only in correspondence, rather than in a defence or admissible evidence, carried no weight in these circumstances.

3. The pleaded publications were capable of bearing seriously defamatory meanings. Applying Lachaux v Independent Print Media Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1134, section 1(1) of the 2013 Act requires serious reputational harm, while section 1(2) requires serious financial loss for a trading body. Both limbs were met: the allegations had a tendency to cause such loss and Pirtek had pleaded uncontradicted actual loss, including £15,000 spent on public-relations assistance.

4. The particulars also adequately pleaded malicious falsehood. They alleged publication, reference to Pirtek, falsity, malice, and pecuniary loss or written statements calculated to cause it. The detailed allegations, if proved, established malice.

5. A final injunction restraining repetition of the allegations, or allegations to the same or similar effect, was necessary and proportionate under Human Rights Act 1998 section 12(4). There was a real and substantial risk of repetition. A mandatory removal order, and an order directed generally at the online accounts regardless of content, would be unnecessarily broad.

6. Summary disposal was appropriate under sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996. Once liability had been established by default, Pirtek did not have to identify and defeat unpleaded defences. There was no realistic defence before the court and no reason for a damages trial. The court awarded the statutory maximum of £10,000.

7. The court declined a declaration of falsity. Such relief was exceptional, and a public press summary of the judgment was a more suitable means of explaining the result. Pirtek received 90% of its costs, summarily assessed at £53,560.

not stated in the judgment.