Levi & Anor v Bates & Ors

A course of conduct must be aimed at someone to constitute harassment, but it need not be aimed at the claimant. A person other than the intended target may sue where the conduct foreseeably and directly harms that person, so that the person is properly regarded as its victim.

Distress arising only from sympathy for the intended target is insufficient. Two incidents may constitute a course of conduct where they share essential characteristics and are closely connected in time, although two incidents will not invariably suffice.

The first respondent pursued a personal grudge against the first appellant through publications concerning their business dealings. Two publications invited football supporters to confront him at the home and telephone number which he shared with his wife, the second appellant. The trial judge found that she suffered anxiety and concern for her own safety, but dismissed her claim because the conduct had not been targeted at her on at least two occasions.

The second appellant appealed from the decision of HHJ Gosnell in Leeds County Court. The principal issue was whether a person who is foreseeably and directly harmed by harassment aimed at someone else may claim under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The requirement that harassment be targeted means that the conduct must be aimed at someone. It does not require the claimant to be its intended target. Lord Phillips MR's observations in Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233 concerned the character of harassing conduct, rather than the identity of those entitled to sue. Simon J went too far in Dowson v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB) by requiring the conduct to be targeted at the claimant.

2. Under sections 1(1) and 3(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, a person other than the intended target may claim where the targeted course of conduct foreseeably and directly harms that person. The claimant must be capable of description as a victim of that conduct. Alarm or distress arising solely from sympathy for the intended target is insufficient. Foreseeability follows from the requirement that the defendant knew or ought to have known that the course of conduct amounted to harassment.

3. The publications inviting supporters to visit or telephone the appellants' shared home foreseeably caused the second appellant direct alarm and concern for her own safety. The two publications shared the same objective and essential characteristics, occurred close together, and focused upon the home in complementary ways. They therefore constituted a sufficient course of conduct under section 7(3)(a), although two incidents will not always suffice.

4. The later publication could not be aggregated with the earlier two. More than three and a half years separated them and it was materially different in character. The second appellant was entitled under section 3(2) to damages for the anxiety caused by the earlier course of conduct. Delay before expiry of the applicable limitation period was no answer to that damages claim. Damages were assessed at £6,000.

5. The refusal of an injunction was upheld. Delay is an important discretionary consideration, and the isolated later incident created no reasonable apprehension of repetition. An injunction protecting the intended target also afforded the second appellant practical protection against further collateral harm.

Ryder and Longmore LJJ agreed with Briggs LJ.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The second appellant's appeal was allowed as to liability and damages. She was awarded £6,000. Her appeal against the refusal of an injunction was dismissed: [2015] EWCA Civ 206.

2. Leeds County Court: HHJ Gosnell dismissed the second appellant's harassment claim because only one incident had been targeted at her, and refused an injunction. The reserved judgment and supplementary judgment were given on 7 June 2012.