Titan Wealth Holdings Limited & Ors v Marian Okunola (Trial)

A claim may proceed to trial where the pleaded case discloses legally recognisable causes of action and the evidence raises factual issues requiring determination. Summary judgment must not become a mini-trial.

Confidential client information, client lists, employment documents, asset information and regulatory communications may retain the necessary quality of confidence after employment ends. An employee’s motive for disclosure does not ordinarily justify breach of contractual or equitable duties of confidence.

Harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is fact-sensitive. Repeated abusive communications may cross the threshold where, objectively assessed, they are oppressive and unacceptable. Truth, humour and freedom of expression do not necessarily establish the statutory defence.

The claimants alleged that the defendant had misused confidential information belonging to or held by two companies in the Titan Wealth Group and had harassed two senior employees. The claims were for breach of contract, breach of confidence and harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

The defendant denied liability and applied to strike out the claims or obtain summary judgment. The court also determined evidential, remedial, civil restraint and costs issues following a three-day trial.

1. The application to strike out or obtain summary judgment was dismissed. The pleaded claims disclosed legally recognisable causes of action, and the issues depended on factual matters including the circumstances in which information was obtained, its confidentiality, the existence of duties, the character of the communications and their reasonableness. Determining those matters would have involved an impermissible mini-trial. The application was certified as totally without merit.
2. The defendant was estopped from challenging the validity of her employment contract because that issue had been conclusively determined in earlier Employment Tribunal proceedings. Employment Tribunal decisions may found issue estoppel. No special circumstances justified reopening the issue.
3. The defendant owed contractual and equitable duties of confidence. Client lists and contact details, employment contracts, asset information, internal company information, FCA communications and CASS-related documents possessed the necessary quality of confidence and had been imparted in circumstances importing a duty of confidence. The defendant’s method of obtaining the information and her alleged motive to expose wrongdoing did not alter that conclusion.
4. The defendant’s circulation of the information breached her contract and equitable duties. The First and Second Claimants’ claims therefore succeeded.
5. The messages sent to or about the Third and Fourth Claimants constituted a course of conduct. They comfortably exceeded the Majrowski threshold, being objectively offensive, abusive, threatening and demeaning, sent in a professional context and with an intention to cause reputational harm. The defendant knew, or ought objectively to have known, that the conduct amounted to harassment.
6. The defence under section 1(3)(c) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was not made out. Truth was not necessarily a defence, and the content and manner of the communications could not be justified by humour or the defendant’s grievances. The interference with Article 10 rights was necessary and proportionate.
7. Final injunctions, deletion and inspection orders, an indemnity concerning specified future losses, and damages were appropriate. The First and Second Claimants were awarded £50,000. The Third and Fourth Claimants were each awarded £15,000 for anxiety caused by harassment.
8. The conditions for an extended civil restraint order were satisfied. The order was the least restrictive protection required and was made for three years. The defendant was ordered to pay the claimants’ costs on the indemnity basis and £288,344.50 on account within 14 days.

First-instance judgment after a three-day trial. The judgment records earlier Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings, but no appeal from this decision.