Idowu OgunkanmiI v Cynthia Chia

In assessing damages for defamation and harassment after default judgment, the court must consider the whole picture. Relevant matters include the gravity of the allegations, the extent and likely impact of publication, the claimant’s reputation and the harm actually proved. Serious allegations do not justify a substantial award where publication was limited and evidence of reputational harm is sparse. Where harassment and defamation substantially overlap, a single global award may avoid double recovery. Any final injunction affecting freedom of expression must be necessary and proportionate under the Human Rights Act 1998. A sustained campaign of unfounded attacks may justify prohibitory relief even where the claimant’s connection with the jurisdiction is limited.

The claimant brought proceedings for defamation and harassment arising from a prolonged campaign of calls, workplace contact and social-media publications by the defendant. Default judgment had been entered against the defendant, who did not participate in the proceedings. The hearing therefore concerned remedies only: the appropriate damages and whether injunctive relief should be granted.

The claimant lived and worked mainly outside England, although the defendant lived in England and the publications and harassment emanated from there. The court considered the effect of that jurisdictional connection, the limited evidence of publication and harm, the overlap between the two causes of action, and the appropriate test for final injunctive relief.

1. Remedies after default. Under CPR 12.12(1), the court assessed damages on the basis of the claimant’s unchallenged pleaded case. The pleaded meanings were not wildly extravagant or impossible and were defamatory.
2. Overlap between torts. The harassment and defamation formed part of the same campaign and the evidence did not permit their effects to be separated reliably. Following the approach identified in Wei v Long, a single award was appropriate to reflect the totality of the damage, harm and distress without double counting.
3. Quantum. Damages for libel are not calculated mathematically. The gravity of the libel is the most important factor, but the extent of publication, the claimant’s pre-existing position, the evidence of actual harm, vindication and aggravating conduct must also be considered. The allegations concerned extremely serious criminality, and the prolonged harassment and malicious conduct aggravated the injury to feelings. However, the social-media audience was small compared with Blake and Seymour v Fox and Aaronson v Stones. There was no evidence of virality or substantial onward publication, and the evidence of reputational harm, particularly in England, was meagre.
4. Jurisdiction. The court assessed harm suffered in England for the harassment claim and took account of the claimant’s main locus of reputation being outside the jurisdiction. The gravity of the allegations remained relevant, but the limited English connection and evidence reduced the award.
5. Injunction. A final injunction restraining further social-media publications about the claimant and direct or indirect contact with him affected freedom of expression. Applying section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the injunctions were necessary and proportionate to protect reputation and private life, given the seriousness, persistence and criminal context of the campaign.
6. The court awarded a single global sum of £25,000 for defamation and harassment. The claimant was awarded costs subject to detailed assessment, taking account of the discontinuance against Meta Inc.