Corinna Zu Sayn-Wittgenstein-Sayn v His Majesty Juan Carlos Alfonso Victor Maria de Borbón y Borbón

A defendant domiciled abroad is ordinarily sued in the courts of that domicile under Article 4.1 of the Brussels Recast Regulation. The special jurisdiction for torts under Article 7(2) is narrow and requires a good arguable case that the harmful event occurred in England. In harassment claims, the relevant event is the complete, connected and objectively oppressive course of conduct, not isolated English incidents. The relevant direct damage is the immediate experience of being harassed, not consequential loss or an ambulatory international experience. A claimant must plead and evidence an English course of conduct or a distinctively English experience. A late jurisdiction challenge following a state-immunity challenge is not necessarily abusive. Amendments cannot evade functional immunity by reintroducing immune conduct as background or evidence.

The Claimant alleged that the Defendant, a former King of Spain domiciled in Spain, had pursued a course of conduct amounting to harassment in connection with their former relationship and a payment of €65m. The Defendant initially challenged jurisdiction on state-immunity grounds. The High Court rejected that challenge, but the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and struck out allegations concerning pre-abdication conduct: [2022] EWHC 668 (QB); [2023] 1 WLR 1162.

The Defendant then challenged the remaining claim under the Brussels Recast Regulation and sought strike-out or summary judgment. The Claimant sought permission to amend, including by reintroducing pre-abdication material, adding personal-injury allegations and pleading intentional infliction of injury. The central issues were whether the harmful event occurred in England, whether the Defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction, and whether the proposed amendments had a real prospect of success.

The Defendant’s jurisdiction application was entertained. The court extended time and granted relief from sanctions so far as necessary. The challenge was not abusive: the earlier state-immunity application had been treated as a self-contained preliminary issue, and the Defendant had reserved his wider jurisdictional position.

1. Brussels Recast jurisdiction. Article 4.1 established the default jurisdiction in the defendant’s domicile. Article 7(2) was a narrow exception requiring a close connection between the claim and the foreign court. The claimant had to show a good arguable case that England was either the place of the event giving rise to the damage or the place where the direct damage occurred. Domestic tort law identified the legally relevant event and harm, while the jurisdictional connecting factor retained an autonomous meaning.
2. Harassment as the harmful event. Under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, harassment was a composite tort. It required at least two linked acts, directed at the claimant, forming a persistent, oppressive and objectively grave course of conduct. Individual incidents did not themselves constitute the relevant harmful event. The Claimant pleaded an international course of conduct but did not identify or evidence a coherent English course of conduct in its own right. The causative limb of Article 7(2) was therefore not established.
3. Direct damage. The legally relevant damage was the immediate experience of being harassed. The Claimant’s alleged experience was ambulatory and international. She did not plead or establish a distinct experience of the pleaded course of conduct in England. Her case therefore did not satisfy the effect limb either. The concept of a centre of interests, developed for internet defamation, was not a freestanding jurisdictional route and did not assist in a harassment claim.
4. Submission. CPR 11(5) did not itself require a finding of submission where a validated jurisdiction application had been made. In any event, the court considered it fair to determine the challenge on its merits.
5. Alternative matters. The proposed amendments concerning pre-abdication conduct would require the English court to investigate and evaluate conduct protected by functional state immunity. State immunity was an absolute preliminary bar and did not permit a half-way house involving fact-finding without formal liability. The proposed personal-injury and intentional-injury amendments also failed the merits and pleading requirements. The intentional-injury claim did not plead an intention to cause physical harm or severe mental or emotional distress, and the psychiatric-injury case was not coherently linked to the post-abdication course of conduct.

The High Court accordingly lacked jurisdiction to try the claim. Alternatively, permission to amend would have been refused and the claim struck out.

1. High Court: The original state-immunity challenge was rejected: [2022] EWHC 668 (QB) .
2. Court of Appeal: The appeal was allowed in part on functional-immunity and pleading-amendment grounds. Pre-abdication allegations were struck out and the rejection of the personal-injury exception was upheld: [2023] 1 WLR 1162 .
3. Present decision: The High Court held that the remaining claim did not fall within the Brussels Recast special jurisdiction.