RBT v YLA

For an interim injunction restraining alleged harassment, the court must assess the likely outcome at trial on the evidence presently available. Harassment requires a persistent and deliberate course of targeted conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable, judged objectively and in context. Threats made for the purpose of extracting money may constitute both blackmail and harassment, substantially reducing the weight given to freedom of expression. Truthful or publicly available information does not prevent conduct from amounting to harassment where its publication forms part of an oppressive course of conduct.

The threshold in Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(3), generally requires the claimant to show that publication is more likely than not to be restrained at trial. The stricter Bonnard v Perryman test applies only where protection of reputation is the sole or main purpose of the application.

The claimant, the founder and chairman of an asset management business, sought continuation of an interim injunction against a former employee. The defendant had sent emails and WhatsApp messages containing threats to publish allegations, use covert recordings and retained business documents, contact third parties, and damage the claimant and his business unless money was paid.

The defendant did not attend the return-date hearing and sought an adjournment on medical grounds without providing adequate medical evidence. The court considered whether to proceed in his absence, whether the threatened conduct was likely to amount to harassment and blackmail, which interim-injunction threshold applied, whether the injunction should continue, and whether the claimant was entitled to costs or default judgment.

1. Hearing in absence. The court proceeded despite the defendant’s absence. His medical assertions were insufficiently evidenced, contained inconsistencies, and had to be weighed against the importance of the hearing, the claimant’s need for protection, and the previous adjournment. The defendant remained able to apply for the return date to be re-run if he obtained proper medical evidence.
2. Harassment. On the limited interim evidence, the communications were likely to be found deliberate, targeted, persistent, oppressive and sufficiently grave to sustain criminal liability under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. They were directed at pressuring the claimant to procure payment. The defendant was likely to know, or ought to have known, that the conduct amounted to harassment.
3. Blackmail and freedom of expression. The communications plainly constituted demands with menaces. The defendant was unlikely to establish reasonable grounds for the demands or that the menaces were a proper means of reinforcing them. His Article 10 rights were therefore unlikely to carry significant weight. Allegations which were false, or even true allegations advanced for the improper purpose of blackmail, could form part of oppressive conduct.
4. Interim threshold. The claimant was more likely than not to obtain a final injunction restraining direct communications and threatened publication. The application’s nub was prevention of blackmail and harassment, not protection of reputation alone. Accordingly, section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 applied rather than the stricter rule in Bonnard v Perryman. In any event, the evidence would have satisfied the stricter test.
5. The injunction was continued until trial or further order, with a clarification permitting communications with legal advisers. The possible effect of witness immunity on reports to the police was left for fuller argument before any final injunction. The defendant was ordered to comply with the order requiring return of business information. Costs were reserved, and the application for default judgment was not determined without a properly listed hearing on notice.