Decker v Hopcraft

On a medical adjournment application, the court must exercise its case-management discretion under the overriding objective. It should require cogent evidence directed to the litigant’s ability to participate in the particular hearing. Capacity depends on the nature of the issues, prior written participation, available adjustments and representation.

A defamation claim cannot satisfy the serious harm requirement by speculating that words may have been republished to unidentified persons. A report to the police of suspected crime is absolutely privileged, so malice does not found liability. Preliminary trials of meaning, fact or opinion, publication and serious harm may provide a proportionate means of resolving the viability of defamation claims.

The claimant, a former secretary of a boxing club, brought two defamation actions against the defendant, the club chairman, arising from statements allegedly made during their dispute. The defendant applied to strike out two claims, to strike out claims for club-constitution injunctions, and for preliminary trials of issues concerning the remaining defamation claims.

Shortly before the hearing, the claimant, acting in person, sought an adjournment on medical grounds and did not attend. The central questions were whether that application should be granted, whether the First and Second Claims were legally viable, and whether preliminary issues should be tried in the Third to Sixth Claims.

1. Adjournment refused. The claimant’s medical material did not establish an inability to participate effectively in this hearing. It was not directed to his ability to conduct litigation, and his extensive, coherent recent correspondence showed substantial cognitive capacity. The applications were relatively focused, their merits had already been fully debated in writing, and reasonable adjustments could have been made. The court therefore proceeded in his absence.

2. First and Second Claims struck out. The First Claim could not satisfy section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. Its pleaded publishees did not believe the alleged words, while the alleged repetition to unknown persons was speculation rather than a properly pleaded publication capable of causing serious harm. The claim would also have been an abuse under Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946. The Second Claim was barred by absolute privilege. Following Westcott v Westcott [2009] QB 407, a complaint to the police of suspected crime, and consequential republication within the police process, are immune from suit; malice is irrelevant.

3. Remaining relief and preliminary issues. It was not appropriate to strike out the requested club-constitution injunctions without further argument on whether they asserted a separate cause of action. That aspect was adjourned with liberty to restore. Preliminary trials were ordered for the Third to Sixth Claims. Determining publication where disputed, meaning, fact or opinion, actionability and serious harm could proportionately establish whether viable claims remained, avoiding unnecessary pleading, disclosure and trial expense. This was consistent with the approach in Ames v The Spamhaus Project Limited [2015] EWHC 127 (QB) and the comparable procedure in Lachaux v AOL (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 915 (QB).

High Court: First-instance case-management decision. Deputy Master Eyre released the initial application for hearing by a judge dealing with defamation matters, and earlier hearing dates had been adjourned on the papers before these applications were heard.