Filippe Alexander Scalora v Clarion Housing Association Limited

In a libel claim, the one-year limitation period runs from publication. A claimant cannot postpone time under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 by awaiting evidence relevant only to the strength of a possible defence. The discretionary power under section 32A is exceptional and requires a satisfactory explanation for both pre-issue and post-issue delay. Under section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013, the comparison is between the statements sued upon, not the articles as a whole. The comparison is made from the claimant’s perspective. An express identification added in a later publication may nevertheless leave the statements substantially the same where the earlier publication, read in context, clearly referred to the claimant. The manner of publication remains a separate question, including whether later publication reached a materially different readership.

The defendant applied for a terminating ruling in a libel claim. The claimant alleged that statements published in the Sun Online Article in June 2022, and in MyLondon and Daily Mirror online articles on 19 October 2022, accused him of colluding in tenancy fraud.

The claim was issued on 16 October 2023. The defendant argued that the June publication was out of time and that section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013 treated the October publications as accruing on the date of the earlier publication. The claimant relied on concealment and discretionary exclusion of the limitation period, and argued that the section 8 issues required a trial.

The central issues were whether the June claim was time-barred, whether section 32 or section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 could assist, and whether the later statements were substantially the same and published in a materially different manner.

1. Sun Online Article. Summary judgment was granted on the claim concerning the June 2022 publication. Any amendment to plead its correct date would take effect from the issue of the claim and would remain out of time.
2. Section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 did not assist. A fact relevant to the claimant’s right of action is a fact needed to plead a prima facie case. It does not include information which would help assess the strength of a potential defence. The claimant alleged no concealment of facts needed to plead libel.
3. The discretion under section 32A was not realistically available. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the length and reasons for delay, knowledge of relevant facts, promptness after knowledge, and evidential prejudice. The burden is heavy because libel claimants must proceed promptly. The claimant delayed about four months before issue and a further six months before relying on section 32A. His reliance on legal advice and a wish to obtain evidence supporting the defendant’s allegations was inadequate. The absence of a Protocol-compliant letter of claim was also material.
4. MyLondon and Mirror Online Articles. The court refused strike-out and summary judgment. Section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013 requires comparison of the particular statement sued upon with the proposed first publication, rather than a line-by-line comparison of the complete articles. That issue can ordinarily be decided before trial on undisputed evidence.
5. On the assumed basis that the defendant was responsible for the first publication, adding the claimant’s name to the later quotations did not make the statements substantially different. The earlier article, read as a whole, plainly referred to him. The court rejected the submission that consent to publication could affect the statutory comparison.
6. The manner-of-publication issue under section 8(4) and (5) remained triable. The later articles might have reached a quantitatively greater and qualitatively different readership. The remaining claims were therefore not struck out and did not receive summary judgment.