Steedman & Ors v British Broadcasting Corporation

When deciding whether to disapply the one-year limitation period for a defamation claim, the court must balance the prejudice to each party and consider all the circumstances. Particular attention must be given to the length of and reasons for the delay and its effect on relevant evidence.

Impairment of the defendant’s ability to defend remains important, but it is not decisive. The policy favouring prompt vindication, an unexplained failure to complain, the strength of the proposed claim and an available negligence claim against former solicitors may all affect the balance. The claimant bears the burden of showing that disapplication is equitable.

Eight Metropolitan Police officers brought a defamation claim against the BBC concerning a broadcast stating that a man had died after being restrained by eight officers and referring to the place where he was killed. The claim form was issued about 15 months after the broadcast. The BBC had received no earlier complaint or notification.

The claim was barred by the one-year period in section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980. Sir Oliver Popplewell refused to disapply that period under section 32A, notwithstanding that the additional delay had not materially impaired the BBC’s ability to defend. The officers appealed against that exercise of discretion.

The central issue was whether the judge had given lawful weight to the unexplained delay, the policy of prompt defamation proceedings, the accrued limitation defence and the officers’ potential claim against their former solicitors.

1. Appeal dismissed. David Steel J, with whom Hale LJ and Brooke LJ agreed, held that the judge had been entitled to conclude that it was not equitable to disapply the limitation period.

2. Section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 confers a largely unfettered discretion. The court must balance the prejudice caused to the claimant by the time bar against the prejudice caused to the defendant by allowing the action to proceed. It must consider all the circumstances, particularly the length of and reasons for the delay and the effect of delay upon the availability or cogency of relevant evidence.

3. The effect of delay on the defendant’s ability to defend remained important, but was not decisive. Hartley v Birmingham City District Council [1992] 1 WLR 968 concerned an exceptional personal injury claim issued only one day late after negotiations where liability was not disputed. Defamation claims require a more cautious approach because their short limitation period reflects the need for prompt vindication and the ephemeral nature of publication. Modern civil procedure also treats delay itself as prejudicial to the administration of justice.

4. No exceptional statutory threshold could be inserted into section 32A. Nevertheless, the policy underlying the one-year period and modern defamation practice formed part of the circumstances relevant to the statutory balance. Hale LJ added that claimants must make out the case for disapplication and that prejudice to the defence cannot be the only consideration.

5. A claimant’s lawyers’ delay must not be treated as misconduct by a claimant who acted promptly and reasonably. It was nevertheless relevant that a negligence claim against those lawyers could reduce the prejudice caused by loss of the defamation claim. The degree of prejudice also depended upon the apparent strength and value of that claim.

6. The BBC’s accrued defence was not a windfall. There had been no negotiations, complaint or notice within the limitation period, followed by a further delay of about three months. The delay was significant and almost wholly unexplained. The officers supplied no adequate evidence that prompt vindication had been important to them, and their proposed defamation claim appeared weak because none was named in the broadcast.

7. The loss of the limitation defence, the unexplained delay, the policy requiring prompt defamation proceedings and the limited prejudice shown by the officers justified refusal of relief. There was no basis for appellate interference with the judge’s discretion.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): By [2001] EWCA Civ 1534, unanimously dismissed the officers’ appeal and upheld the refusal to disapply the limitation period.

2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Sir Oliver Popplewell refused the application under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 and refused permission to appeal. No citation is stated.