Desmond Campbell v Simon Craig & Anor

A general civil restraint order may be made even after the relevant claim has been struck out and need not remain tied to existing proceedings. The court must assess whether repeated claims or applications have been certified as totally without merit and whether narrower restraint would be insufficient. A medical fit note does not, by itself, establish that a litigant cannot participate in a hearing. The applicant must explain the functional limitations relied on, and the court must compare them with the hearing’s requirements, including possible accommodations. A hearing is not necessarily required where the affected party has no arguable answer on the merits and has an available application to set the order aside.

The applicant sought permission to appeal against two general civil restraint orders made by the County Court. The first order was made by HHJ Luba KC on 24 May 2022 and the second by HHJ Roberts on 19 August 2024 after the first order expired. Both orders restricted the applicant from issuing claims or making applications in the County Court without permission.

By the time of the High Court hearing, a later restraint order made by Eady J on 21 July 2025 had superseded the second order. The proposed appeals were therefore academic, but the court considered their merits briefly. The central issues were whether the orders could be made after the relevant claim had been struck out, whether a hearing was required, whether the absence of a Defence was material, and whether an error in recording one prior totally-without-merit finding invalidated the order.

1. Permission to appeal refused. Both proposed appeals were academic because later restraint proceedings had exhausted or superseded the challenged orders. In any event, neither appeal had a real prospect of success or any other compelling reason to proceed.

2. On the medical adjournment issue, Decker v Hopcraft [2015] EWHC 1170 (QB) required careful scrutiny of the evidence. A fit note stating that a person was unfit for work was not proof that the person was unable to participate in a court hearing. The applicant had to explain what he could and could not do, and the court had to compare that evidence with the nature and requirements of the hearing, including possible accommodations such as remote attendance.

3. The GCRO application was properly determined on the basis of historic findings made by other judges. The evidence of serial litigation, repeated findings that applications were totally without merit, and unpaid costs orders amply justified the order. The absence of a Defence was irrelevant to whether a GCRO should be made.

4. A GCRO was not precluded merely because the claim in which it was made had already been struck out. CPR rules 3.3(9) and 3.4(6), together with Practice Direction 3C, showed that restraint orders were protective measures which were not tied to particular live proceedings and could be made after strike-out. Practice Direction 3C also permitted a GCRO where a party persisted in issuing totally-without-merit claims or applications and an ECRO would be insufficient or inappropriate.

5. A paper determination was permissible. The right under rule 28.3 to apply to set aside, vary or stay an order provided an appropriate safeguard where no hearing had been held. No hearing was required where the applicant had identified no substantive answer to the merits of the GCRO application.

6. The mistaken inclusion of the Roberts order itself in the list of prior findings did not undermine the order because five later totally-without-merit findings independently justified it. Both applications were dismissed and certified as totally without merit. No costs order was made.

• High Court (King's Bench Division): Permission to appeal against the County Court’s Luba and Roberts general civil restraint orders was refused. Both applications were dismissed and certified as totally without merit.