Anthony John Wright & Ors v Dominic Joseph Andrew Chappell & Ors

Whether to adjourn a trial depends principally on whether proceeding would be fair in all the circumstances. The assessment is fact-sensitive and must consider conduct, delay, prejudice, costs and court resources. Imprisonment alone creates no entitlement to an adjournment. However, where medical treatment makes participation practically impossible, fairness may require an adjournment despite inconvenience to other parties and court users. The court may sever one party’s claims into separate proceedings where that is the least inconvenient course. An unless order requiring service of Points of Defence must be construed precisely; absent clear wording, defective pleading does not necessarily debarr a party from defending.

The liquidators of companies in the BHS Group brought claims under sections 212 and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 against former directors. The trial had begun when Dominic Chappell, recently released from prison and undergoing treatment for prostate cancer, applied for a six-month adjournment.

He relied on imprisonment, lack of disclosure and a trial bundle, inability to obtain representation, medical appointments and the risk of an unfair trial. The court also considered whether his Points of Defence complied with an earlier unless order and whether his claims should be severed from those against the other respondents.

1. Adjournment. The application was granted. Imprisonment alone did not entitle Mr Chappell to an adjournment, and the court would ordinarily have allowed only a short period for preparation. The liquidators had not caused his delay, and a fair trial could otherwise have taken place. However, the court accepted that participation in the heavy trial was not practically possible during cancer treatment. Continuing against him would therefore be unfair. Applying the fairness principle in Bilta (UK) Ltd v Tradition Financial Services Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 221, the claims had to be adjourned despite inconvenience to the other parties and court users.
2. Severance. The claims against Mr Chappell were directed to be dealt with as separate proceedings under CPR Part 3.1(2)(e), while the claims against the other respondents continued. Although separate proceedings risked duplicated court time and inconsistent findings, severance was the least inconvenient course. The alternative would impose substantial additional costs and risk exhausting the other respondents’ insurance.
3. Points of Defence. Mr Chappell was not debarred from defending under the earlier order. The order required service of Points of Defence but did not clearly require fully particularised pleadings complying with CPR Part 16.5. Defective pleading could instead attract the consequences prescribed by CPR Part 16.5 and Part 15.6, including admissions of allegations not properly dealt with.
4. The trial against the other respondents was to continue, with the adjourned claims subject to further directions.