Dunnage v Kathleen Bernadette Randall UK Insurance Ltd

An adult defendant’s conduct in negligence is judged by the objective standard of the reasonable person. Mental or physical illness does not lower that standard. Medical incapacity excuses liability only where it entirely removes the defendant’s responsibility for the injury, so that the defendant did nothing to cause it. Conduct directed by a deluded mind may be irrational, but is not thereby legally involuntary. Where the insured did not intend to injure the claimant, resulting bodily injury may be accidental under a liability policy. An exclusion for wilful or malicious acts does not then apply.

The claimant was severely burned when his uncle, Vince, brought petrol and a lighter into the claimant’s home, poured petrol over himself, and ignited it during a struggle. Vince, who died at the scene, was suffering from florid paranoid schizophrenia.

His estate and household insurer successfully resisted the negligence claim in the Central London County Court. The judge held that Vince’s illness had made his actions involuntary and therefore outside the scope of the duty of care. The claimant appealed.

The appeal concerned whether conduct directed by a severely deluded mind was legally involuntary so as to prevent negligence liability, and whether any resulting liability was covered as accidental bodily injury under the household policy.

1. Appeal allowed. Rafferty LJ, Vos LJ and Arden LJ agreed that the judge’s conclusion that Vince incurred no negligence liability was not open on the agreed expert evidence.
2. An adult owed the claimant an ordinary duty to take reasonable care. The standard for breach was objective and was not reduced to reflect physical or mental illness. The limited adjustment made for children did not extend to adults with medical conditions. The law did not distinguish between mental and physical illness for this purpose.
3. A defendant is excused only where an unexpected incapacitating event entirely eliminates responsibility for the injury, so that the defendant did nothing to cause it. That may include automatism or physical movements controlled by another. It does not include conduct which the defendant’s own mind directs merely because the conduct is deluded or irrational. As explained in Coley v R [2013] EWCA Crim 223, irrationality is distinct from legal involuntariness.
4. Vince retained physical control of his actions. His deranged mind directed the acts which caused the injury. He deliberately brought the petrol and lighter into the claimant’s flat and acted in a manner falling below the reasonable-person standard. His inability to act rationally did not remove that breach. No retrial was required.
5. The injury was accidental for the purposes of the policy. On the evidence Vince did not intend to injure the claimant and could not be characterised as wilful or malicious. The exclusion therefore did not apply. The court declared that the first defendant was liable in damages for negligence.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). By [2015] EWCA Civ 673 , the court allowed the claimant’s appeal and declared the first defendant liable in negligence.
• Central London County Court. HHJ Saggerson dismissed the negligence claim after a liability trial, holding that Vince’s actions were involuntary because of the extreme manifestation of his mental illness.