Coley & Ors v R

For the purposes of the M’Naghten rules, a disease of the mind is a legal, rather than medical, classification. The direct and acute effects of voluntarily consumed intoxicants, even if they produce psychotic symptoms or detachment from reality, are not a disease of the mind. Automatism requires a complete destruction of voluntary control, not merely irrational, disinhibited or deluded conduct.

Voluntary intoxication does not extend to a defendant who, when offending, is no longer intoxicated but is suffering from a genuine mental illness caused by earlier drinking. Such a defendant is entitled to have subjective recklessness determined on the facts. The continued scope of any intoxication exception to subjective recklessness was left open.

Three appeals were heard together because each concerned the interaction of voluntary intoxication with insanity, automatism or recklessness.

• Coley was convicted at Wolverhampton Crown Court of attempted murder after a serious knife attack. The trial judge withdrew insanity and automatism from the jury. He also appealed an 18-year custodial sentence.
• McGhee was convicted at Blacfriars Crown Court of wounding with intent. The trial judge ruled that automatism was not available following alcohol and temazepam consumption.
• Harris pleaded guilty at Cardiff Crown Court to aggravated arson contrary to section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, after the judge applied voluntary-intoxication principles to recklessness.

The central questions were whether the relevant conditions amounted to insanity or automatism, and whether a psychotic mental illness following alcohol withdrawal could negate subjective recklessness.

1. Coley’s conviction appeal was dismissed. The court held that, although a transient psychotic episode could be a defect of reason, a disease of the mind under the M’Naghten rules is a legal concept. The direct and acute effects of voluntarily taken cannabis were governed by voluntary-intoxication principles, not insanity. The distinction between intoxication and a disease induced by intoxicants was maintained: see DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, R v Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563 and R v Quick [1973] QB 910.
2. Automatism required complete destruction of voluntary control, as distinct from irrational or deluded behaviour. Coley’s organised conduct, including dressing, arming himself and entering the neighbouring house, could not amount to wholly involuntary action. In any event, an acute condition induced by voluntary intoxication did not make automatism available. The court added, obiter, that a legitimate issue of automatism should not invariably be withdrawn merely because a jury must decide specific intent.
3. McGhee’s conviction appeal was dismissed. The pharmacological evidence described disinhibition, not total loss of voluntary control. The CCTV evidence also showed sustained voluntary behaviour. His voluntary alcohol consumption supplied a further reason why automatism could not succeed.
4. Harris’s conviction appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed. He was not intoxicated when he set the fire, having stopped drinking five or six days earlier. He was suffering from a genuine, albeit temporary, mental illness with psychotic symptoms. DPP v Majewski did not extend to mental illness caused by past voluntary drinking. He was entitled to have the jury determine whether he was actually aware of the risk to his neighbours under the subjective-recklessness test in R v G [2003] UKHL 50. No retrial was ordered in the public interest.
5. Coley’s sentence appeal was allowed to a limited extent. The court substituted 15 years’ youth custody for 18 years’ custody. It held that age adjustments are flexible and a sentence should not change abruptly on a defendant’s eighteenth birthday.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Coley’s appeal against conviction was dismissed, but his sentence was reduced from 18 years’ custody to 15 years’ youth custody. McGhee’s appeal against conviction was dismissed. Harris’s appeal against conviction was allowed and his conviction was quashed without a retrial.
• Crown Courts: Coley was convicted of attempted murder at Wolverhampton Crown Court. McGhee was convicted of wounding with intent at Blacfriars Crown Court. Harris pleaded guilty to aggravated arson at Cardiff Crown Court after a ruling applying voluntary-intoxication principles to recklessness.