Rachel Riley v Mike Sivier

Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 requires a claimant to prove serious reputational harm caused, or likely to be caused, by the particular publication. The assessment is fact-sensitive and may rely on inference from the meaning, gravity, scale and circumstances of publication, the claimant’s position and the inherent probabilities.

The public interest defence under section 4 requires proof that the statement concerned a matter of public interest, that the defendant actually believed publication was in the public interest, and that the belief was reasonable. The court must assess all the circumstances, including verification, opportunity to comment, balance and the range of meanings conveyed. Editorial latitude does not protect a publication based on materially inadequate inquiry and unsupported allegations.

The claimant, a television presenter, sued a blogger over an article alleging that she had engaged in, supported and encouraged online abuse and harassment of a 16-year-old girl, including conduct said to have provoked death threats. The words had previously been determined to bear a single defamatory meaning.

Truth and honest opinion defences had been struck out. The Court of Appeal restored only the public interest defence for determination at trial. The issues were whether the publication had caused serious harm under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, whether the defendant established the section 4 public interest defence, and, if not, the appropriate remedy and damages.

1. Serious harm. The claimant proved serious harm under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013. The assessment concerned the Article itself, not the cumulative effect of earlier publications. Serious harm could be inferred from the grave meaning, publication to about 50,000 readers, the claimant’s public role and the likely grapevine effect.
2. Evidence of a pre-existing bad reputation was subject to strict limits. It had to concern the relevant sector of reputation and could not be proved by specific alleged misconduct, other defamatory allegations in the publication, or earlier publications relied on contrary to the Dingle rule. No admissible evidence established a relevant bad reputation.
3. Public interest. The Article concerned matters of public interest, and the defendant honestly believed that publication was in the public interest. However, his belief was unreasonable. He wrote at speed, failed to make reasonable inquiries, relied heavily on the Lawson articles, did not verify important allegations, did not seek the claimant’s comment, and omitted her denial.
4. The court had to assess the statement complained of and its range of meanings. The more serious meaning was obvious and could not reasonably be ignored. The defendant’s interpretation of the claimant’s exchanges with the girl was unsupported by the underlying communications, which were largely civil and did not encourage abuse or death threats. The Article was materially unbalanced.
5. The section 4 defence therefore failed because the requirement of reasonable belief was not met. The claimant succeeded in the defamation claim.
6. An injunction was granted requiring removal of the Article and restraining republication of it or words to similar effect. Damages were awarded in the sum of £50,000, inclusive of aggravation; no separate aggravated damages award was made.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): the claimant succeeded after trial; damages of £50,000 and an injunction were ordered.
• Court of Appeal: the defendant’s appeal against striking out the public interest defence was allowed, and that defence was restored for trial. Permission to appeal concerning truth and honest opinion was refused.